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with game theoretic principles of reciprocity and assurances, I examine how manager and analyst
self interests shape managerial behavior. Drawing on a sample from the insurance industry from
2001-2012 I isolate a discrete managerial self-interested behavior by observing risk aversion in
claim reserve levels. I find managers increase their self-interested behavior when analysts issue
optimistic forecasts, but optimism has diminishing returns as managers perceive overly
optimistic forecasts as challenging performance targets. Strong performance minimizes investor
scrutiny, which strengthens the relationship between forecast optimism and managerial selfinterested behavior. I further advance a model that incorporates analyst interest in obtaining
internal access to firm operations and managers. When accessible managers coordinate with
optimistic analysts managers are assured that overly optimistic forecasts will not constrain their
self-interested behavior. However, contrary to expectations, managerial accessibility weakens
the relationship between forecast optimism and managerial self-interested behavior, suggesting
managers maximize their self-interested behavior when they restrict their accessibility.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Managers and Securities Analysts
Securities analysts have long demonstrated influence over a firm’s market value (Brown,
Foster, & Noreen, 1985; Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, & Lee, 2004; Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996;
Zuckerman, 1999), sparking interest among strategic management scholars who seek to
understand the drivers of firm performance and managerial behavior related to firm value.
Within the strategic management literature, two dominant theoretical perspectives have emerged
to explain the role of analysts in shaping the drivers of underlying firm value. Taking an
institutional perspective, scholars argue that analysts have emerged as powerful institutions
shaping the behavior of legitimacy-seeking managers (e.g. Benner, 2010; Rao & Sivakumar,
1999; Westphal & Graebner, 2010; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011; Zuckerman, 2000). Scholars have
also taken an agency monitoring perspective of analysts (e.g. Gentry & Shen, 2013; Wright,
Kroll, & Elenkov, 2002), whereby ill-informed owners rely on analysts to monitor and relay
information about managerial behavior (Luo, Wang, Raithel, & Zheng, 2015). Invoking these
two perspectives, scholars have found analysts predictive of a range of managerial behaviors and
decisions that are critical determinants of firm value. For example, analysts shape managers’
temporal horizon (Zhang & Gimeno, 2010), business portfolio decisions (Litov, Moreton, &
Zenger, 2012; Zuckerman, 2000) and tendency in invest in innovation (Benner & Ranganathan,
2012; Gentry & Shen, 2013).
Beyond the influence that analysts, as powerful institutional monitors, exercise over
managerial decisions, the management literature at the interface between managers and securities
analysts has further advanced to capture some behavioral exchange between managers and
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analysts through signaling and impression management. Firms make personnel decisions to send
positive signals to securities analysts (Gomulya & Boeker, 2014). Moreover, managers engage
in impression management to maintain positive recommendations (Fanelli, Misangyi, & Tosi,
2009; Westphal & Graebner, 2010), using earnings guidance to keep analyst forecasts attainable
(Washburn & Bromiley, 2014; Zhang & Gimeno, 2010). However, most of this work looks at
these managerial actions as defensive responses to negative analyst outputs (Westphal &
Clement, 2008; Zhang & Gimeno, 2010). Thus, the current state of the literature has a decidedly
reactive view of managers with respect to analysts, treating analysts as external sources of
pressure shaping managerial behavior.
There are indicators that managers can be more assertive in their relationship with
analysts than current literature suggests. As finance and accounting scholars study the predictors
of analysts’ forecasts and recommendations, they often reference significant unobservable
influences in analyst forecasts that they attribute to private information managers are sharing
with analysts (Bernhardt, Campello, & Kutsoati, 2006; Chan & Hameed, 2006; Clement & Tse,
2005; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Lim, 2001). This suggests that managers, as gatekeepers to this
information, have an influential tool at their disposal when interacting with analysts, allowing
managers to actively engage with analysts.
Integrating key insights from the finance literature to management models of the
manager-analyst interface suggests that the current exogenous understanding of analysts in the
management literature does not fully capture the endogenous interplay between managers and
analysts. Evidence from the management literature that managerial behavior is influenced by
analysts and evidence from the finance and accounting literature that analyst behavior is
influenced by managers suggests that both groups are active participants in their interactions and
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their behaviors are highly interdependent. Furthermore, the interaction between analysts and
managers is likely to take multiple forms, beyond the form where managers are reactive that is
most pervasive in the current management literature. Using game theoretic reasoning to shape
agency arguments, this dissertation builds a theory of the interdependence between managers and
analysts and their choices to coordinate.

1.2 Preview of Hypotheses
In reviewing the management literature on analysts, there is evidence that managers
engage in analyst-directed impression management tactics (Fanelli et al., 2009) and managers
control access to private information that is critical to analysts (e.g. Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy,
2010; Healy & Palepu, 2001). Furthermore, many authors have alluded to a highly dynamic
interplay between managers and analysts that is characterized by exchanging favors (Westphal &
Clement, 2008) or by an interactive negotiation (Zhang & Gimeno, 2010). Building on this
work, I endeavor to unpack the behavioral exchange that happens at manager-analyst interface,
empirically examining specific behaviors that managers and analysts have at their disposal to
shape the value of the other’s self-interested outcome. Using game-theoretic arguments of
coordination in behavioral exchange to refine agency-theoretic arguments of managerial selfinterested behavior, I test a model of the interdependence between managers and analysts.
Figure 1 provides a summary of my proposed theoretical model and hypothesized relationships.
First, drawing on agency theory, managers are motivated by self-interest that can conflict
with owner interests and lead managers to behave in self-serving ways (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen
& Meckling, 1976). For example, managers motivated by their own self-interests engage in
behavior that is effective in maintaining their employment and income but not necessarily in the
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best interest of owners (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Given
managers’ self-serving motivations, I argue that optimistic analyst forecasts provide favorable
conditions for managers to engage in self-interested behavior. Specifically, pessimistic forecasts
attract investor attention (Westphal & Clement, 2008; Zhang & Gimeno, 2010), thereby limiting
managers’ ability to act self-interestedly. On the other hand, managers do not like overly
optimistic forecasts either (Cotter, Tuna, & Wysocki, 2006) because these high forecasts are
viewed as public earnings targets that have the potential to draw investor attention if missed
(Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005). Thus, optimistic analyst forecasts allow managers to
engage in self-interested behavior without scrutiny from financial markets and backlash from
investors but decreasingly so at high levels of optimism, revealing a non-linear relationship
between analyst forecast optimism and managerial self-interested behavior. Furthermore, when
firm performance is strong, investors are less likely to scrutinize managerial behavior,
particularly when analysts are also offering a positive outlook. On the other hand, weak firm
performance should draw investor attention to managerial behavior, regardless of analysts’
forecasts.
While analyst forecast optimism provides managers with more opportunity to act selfinterestedly, analysts also have interests of their own. Analysts desire access to unique private
information (Cohen et al., 2010) to differentiate their forecasts and recommendations in order to
maximize their professional recognition and wealth (Hong & Kubik, 2003; Ramnath, Rock, &
Shane, 2008). There is evidence that analysts issue optimistic forecasts to maintain open
information channels with managers (Lim, 2001). Knowing the importance of internal
accessibility to analysts and in an effort to bond with analysts who direct the attention of owners,
agency theory suggests managers will make minor concessions to their self-interests to protect
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against larger losses to those self-interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983a; Mahoney, 2005). Thus
managers, incurring scrutiny costs by being more accessible to analysts, will nonetheless provide
analysts with this access when they issue optimistic forecasts to preserve ongoing analyst
optimism that benefits managerial self-interested behavior.
While the tradeoff rooted in bonding arguments provides theoretical support for the
exchange between managers and analysts, there is dependence assumed in these exchanges that
bonding arguments insufficiently handle. Managers are only likely to be accessible to analysts if
managers realize benefits to their self-interested behavior as a result of optimistic analyst
forecasts. Thus, reciprocity is a critical assumption in this model. Reciprocity involves
matching behaviors among two parties, both exchanging mutually beneficial resources or both
withholding those resources (Parkhe, 1993). Consideration of reciprocity invokes game theoretic
reasoning to study strategic interactions (Saloner, 1991). When making the decision to insure
their self-interest by bonding with analysts, managers have to speculate on the actions the other
party will take and the impact these actions will have on their own payoffs (Camerer, 1991; Dixit
& Nalebuff, 1991). In a show of reciprocity for self-interested behavior that analyst optimism
afforded them, managers are likely to be more accessible. Thus, the positive relationship
between analyst optimism and managerial accessibility is fully mediated by managerial selfinterested behavior.
Further applying game theoretic reasoning to the exchange relationship between
managers and analysts, this exchange fits the pattern of an assurance game with two dominant
equilibria where mutual coordination leads to the highest outcomes for both players and mutual
defection indicates more modest outcomes (Agarwal, Croson, & Mahoney, 2010; Kollock,
1998). Correspondingly, when accessible managers and optimistic analysts coordinate,
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managers should achieve their highest levels of self-interested behavior, suggesting that
accessibility strengthens the relationship between analyst forecast optimism and managerial selfinterested behavior. In addition, coordination choices in repeated assurance games have
polarizing effects, leading players to over-coordinate or completely ignore each other (Schelling,
2011). This suggests that under conditions of mutual coordination analysts will over-coordinate
by relaxing their role as monitors and moderating their forecast revisions throughout the year in a
lenient way that does not attract investor attention (Amir & Ganzach, 1998). Under these more
lenient conditions managers no longer need to dampen their self-interested behavior in the face
of overly optimistic forecasts, suggesting that the curvilinear relationship between analyst
forecast optimism and managerial self-interested behavior is more linear when managers are
accessible.

1.3 Research Setting
I use reserves in the insurance industry to isolate a discrete managerial self-interested
behavior. By focusing on this observable case of self-interested behavior in the insurance
industry I am able to empirically examine a commonly theorized, but difficult to measure,
variable of interest because it is unobservable in many other industries (Souder & Shaver, 2010).
Reserve levels represent an observable activity over which managers can exercise significant
discretion (Beaver, McNichols, & Nelson, 2003). While this measure is similar in principal to
cash reserves (O'Brien & Folta, 2009) and slack (Bromiley, 1991) that the agency literature has
identified as means self-interested managers can use toward projects that build their legacy
(Matta & Beamish, 2008) and power (Baldenius, Melumad, & Meng, 2014), it is also directly
related to risk aversion, a dominant managerial self-interested behavior identified in the agency
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literature (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Eisenhardt, 1989). Future benefit and claims obligations are
the most significant liability for an insurer (Nissim, 2010). These obligations are often not
settled in the same time period that revenues (i.e., premiums) are collected and need to be
estimated and held in reserves. Under-reserving for benefit and claim losses is risky, while overreserving is an indicator of risk aversion and affords managers extra slack to invest in projects of
their choice when these over-funded reserves are later released. Furthermore, while reserve
levels are observable and well understood by industry experts such as security analysts, the
broader investing audience is not as attuned to this accounting behavior (Graham et al., 2005).
This information asymmetry between analysts and investors provides the opportunity for
analysts to exercise discretion over how stringently they evaluate managerial reserve decisions.
In addition to the industry-specific research setting, I select a time period after the
implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) in 2000. RegFD limited managers’
ability to selectively disclose private information to anyone, requiring any disclosures to be made
public to all at the same time. However, even after the implementation of RegFD analysts
depend on access to management and general managerial transparency to spot both positive and
negative trends that are critical to analysts’ accuracy and reputation (Hershberg, 2012). Thus, I
position my study in the post-RegFD era, which is most relevant to current management practice,
because the use of private disclosures has changed substantially following RegFD (Agrawal,
Chadha, & Chen, 2006; Cohen et al., 2010). Instead, I put forward a more passive form of
exchange between managers and analysts whereby managers allow analysts internal access but
analysts must then draw their own conclusions.
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1.4 Summary of Findings and Contributions
Expanding on the current institutional agency monitoring perspective of analysts as they
interact with managers, I do not assume a deferential role for managers in their interaction with
analysts. Managers and analysts engage with one another to maximize their own self-interests. I
find support for the idea that managers are able to engage in self-interested behavior when
analysts issue optimistic forecasts, particularly when firm performance is strong.
Drawing on game theoretic insights, I argue the interdependence among managers and
analysts places constraints on the value of their individual outcomes. Managers and analysts are
making choices that are embedded in a pattern of reciprocity where managers take seemingly
counterproductive actions to insure their own self-interests. However, while I find some support
in a post hoc analysis of a significant relationship between optimistic forecasts and managerial
accessibility, it is in the opposite direction than hypothesized. It appears managers are more
accessible to placate pessimistic analysts, not as a show of reciprocity toward optimistic analysts.
Consistent with this lack of reciprocity, I also do not find support that managerial self-interested
behavior plays any role in the relationship between analyst forecasts and managerial
accessibility. It is possible the lack of support can be attributed to measurement error with these
variables being measured too distally to capture the hypothesized relationships.
Finally, I argue that the nature of the assurance game between managers and analysts
suggests the payoffs that managers realize to their self-interested behavior will be highest when
accessible managers coordinate with optimistic analysts and more linear as overly optimistic
analysts over-coordinate by being more lenient on accessible managers. I did find evidence for
the later effect, such that the relationship between analyst forecast optimism and managerial selfinterested behavior is more linear when managers are accessible to analysts. However, the
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overall relationship is not stronger as expected. In fact, the results show a significant effect in
the opposite direction – the relationship between analysts forecast optimism and managerial selfinterested behavior is weaker when managers are accessible. These findings reveal a result more
consistent with a prisoner’s dilemma game than an assurance game, suggesting managers and
analysts may not interact in ways that foster coordination as I expected. I further explore this
unexpected result in a post-hoc analysis that provides additional insights. This supplementary
analysis suggests that firm performance could be changing the motivation of managers and
analysts to coordinate. When firm performance is strong managers are able to maximize their
self-interested behavior relative to more optimistic forecasts by limiting their accessibility.
Under these favorable conditions managers have little incentive to be accessible, but analysts still
have incentive to be optimistic, as their customers depend on them to cover high performing
firms (Irvine, 2004). Thus, strong firm performance may create asymmetry in the exchange
relationship between managers and analysts and change the value of their mutual coordination
for managers.
I contribute to current theory by capturing the interdependent and mutually active
interplay between managers and analysts, providing a richer understanding of the relationship
between managers and analysts than is appreciated in the current literature. In using gametheoretic reasoning to inform an agency-based model of managers and analysts, I make several
theoretical contributions. First, I illuminate the interdependence between managers and analysts
by defining the interdependent behaviors managers and analysts engage in, namely analyst
optimism and managerial accessibility. I articulate how and why these behaviors impact the
other’s individual utility and incorporate the role reciprocity plays in activating these behaviors.
Second, I find variation in the exchange between managers and analysts stemming from the
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ability of managers to be active participants in their relationship with securities analysts.
Managers are not strictly reactive to analysts; managers are able to actively limit their
accessibility to optimistic analysts toward self-interested ends.
By examining the self-interested motivations of both managers and analysts, this
dissertation responds to a call for concrete examples of opportunistic interdependence between
stakeholder groups and examination of the outcomes of this interdependence (von Werder,
2011). Through the self-motivated exchanges between managers and analysts, owners are not
always extracting maximum value from either managers or analysts. This introduces a
contingency on agency theory, where interdependence among non-principals modifies typical
agency outcomes. Coordination between an agent and an intermediary for their principal or even
the desire for coordination on the part of the intermediary can lead to multiplicative agency costs
as the agent uses the intermediary to shield their self-interested behavior. Moreover, the
application of game theoretic reasoning to managers and analysts has important theoretical
implications because it is representative of a reality that scholars have observed in other contexts
(Harris, Johnson, & Souder, 2013). The potential of reciprocity fueling coordination in ways that
impair firm outcomes, is similar to investors and underwriters coordinating to underprice IPOs
(e.g. Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson, 2008).
In addition, I make three key empirical extensions in the measurement of critical
managerial and analyst constructs and identification of a non-linear relationship between these
manager and analysts constructs. First, I isolate a discrete managerial self-interested behavior by
measuring risk aversion observed through reserves in the insurance industry. Measures of risk
averse behavior on the part of managers are often composite measures, such as aggregates of
debt, R&D and capital expenditures (e.g. Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008; Miller
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& Bromiley, 1990) that impede free choice on the part of the manager and fail to isolate specific
risk decisions. Reserve behavior is a specific decision managers make in the insurance industry
that has risk properties. Second, finance and accounting scholars have long lamented the lack of
measures available to capture managerial private information disclosures (Core, 2001; Healy &
Palepu, 2001; Lang & Lundholm, 1993) and there is little discussion of any derivative of this
practice continuing in a post-RegFD environment. Thus, I introduce a more passive proxy of
information exchange from managers to securities analysts by measuring managerial
accessibility. By measuring the intensity of the annual interaction between managers and
analysts who cover their firm I can capture how accessible managers are to analysts post-RegFD.
Third, I test a curvilinear form of analyst forecast optimism to capture a concept often
discussed in the literature, but not often modeled – managers want analysts to be optimistic, but
not too optimistic. By including a quadratic term on forecast optimism in my models, I find that
managerial self-interested behavior increases with analyst optimism but this effect tapers off as
the pressure of overly high and public performance targets weighs on managers. Furthermore,
most of the management literature has placed emphasis on the pessimistic end of analyst
forecasts, but analyst forecasts are considered to be optimistically biased (De Bondt & Thaler,
1990). Thus, examining the effects of optimism is perhaps more critical to understanding analyst
impact on management phenomena.
Finally, this work has broader implications to management theory and practice. First,
managers and analysts are adaptable to regulatory changes. After RegFD, information is still
critical to analysts motivating them to seek out information through more passive means that
managers can manipulate to achieve their self-interested goals. Second, analysts are flawed
monitors, a double-edged sword for owners. Analysts are important to attracting capital and
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maintaining market value (e.g. Brown et al., 1985; Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Zuckerman, 1999),
but, influenced by their self-interests, they also engage with managers in such a way that
encourages non-optimal uses of firm capital.
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CHAPTER 2: A LITERATURE REVIEW AT THE MANAGER AND ANALYST
INTERFACE

2.1 Securities Analysts Defined
Securities analysts, also known as financial analysts, conduct financial analysis primarily
on publicly traded companies. Since the 1980’s large-scale growth in individual wealth grew the
ranks of individual investors and correspondingly elevated the role of securities analysts in
evaluating firm performance (Useem, 1996). Securities analysts forecast earnings and other
financial measures, issue recommendations (Schipper, 1991) and make other verbal (e.g.
Frankel, Mayew, & Sun, 2010) and written assessments (e.g. Benner, 2010; Feldman, Gilson, &
Villalonga, 2014) about the current state and future prospects of the firm.
The two primary types of securities analysts are sell-side and buy-side analysts. Sell-side
analysts primarily work for brokerage firms and investment banks, while buy-side analysts work
for institutional investors (Groysberg, Healy, Serafeim, & Shanthikumar, 2013). Going forward,
unless otherwise noted, I will focus specifically on sell-side analysts. Buy-side analysts, like
sell-side analysts, make stock recommendations but, since they are largely employed by
institutional investors, their output is specific to each institution’s needs (Schipper, 1991). As
employees of institutional investors and effectively proxies for owners, buy-side analysts more
closely meet the needs of investors (Groysberg et al., 2013), and, as a result, do not sit squarely
in the middle of the investor-manager relationship (Harris & Souder, 2004). On the other hand,
sell-side analysts not only produce earnings forecasts and make stock recommendations for a
broader public audience, which often includes buy-side analysts (Schipper, 1991), but sell-side
analysts also are likely to engage in reciprocal relationships with managers (Dirsmith &
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Covaleski, 1983; Fanelli et al., 2009; Westphal & Graebner, 2010). Thus, going forward I will
be focused on sell-side analysts, simply referring to them as securities analysts or analysts.

2.2 The Contribution of Management Research to the Organization-Analyst Interface
The empirical study of analysts originates in the finance and accounting literature with
the finance literature largely focused on the relationship between investors and analysts as they
seek to understand the role of analysts in capital markets. Given the relevance of analysts to
investors and firm capital market value (Brown et al., 1985; Elton, Gruber, & Gultekin, 1981;
Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996) and analysts’ ability to serve as accurate
strategy informants (Chen, Farh, & MacMillan, 1993), organization and management scholars
have likewise taken an interest in analyst-related scholarship ranging from using analyst outputs
as proxy measures of organizational constructs (Bromiley, 1991; Navis & Glynn, 2010) to
exogenously incorporating analyst behavior into models of organizational and managerial
behavior. Given my emphasis on the relationship between managers and analysts, I will focus
this review on the latter, examining the impact of analysts on strategic behavior within
organizations, the dynamic nature of the relationship between managers and analysts, and
important qualifiers that management scholars have identified in analyst behavior that likely
inform analysts’ relationships with managers.
Management scholars have shifted the conversation related to securities analysts in three
important ways. First, management scholars have focused on analysts’ relationships to critical
strategic firm behaviors that are controlled by managers and significantly influence overall firm
value, such as corporate social performance (Luo et al., 2015), the horizon of competitive
managerial decisions (Zhang & Gimeno, 2010), the convergence of business portfolio decisions
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(Feldman et al., 2014; Litov et al., 2012; Nicolai, Schulz, & Thomas, 2010; Zuckerman, 2000)
and the tendency to invest in innovation (Benner, 2010; Benner & Ranganathan, 2012; Gentry &
Shen, 2013). Strategic management scholars have also highlighted the role analysts play in
validating and shaping a firm’s internal organization, including top management personnel
decisions (Gomulya & Boeker, 2014; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011) and
internal organizational structure (Rao & Sivakumar, 1999). Second, management scholars have
placed emphasis on the analyst-manager interface by recognizing that there is a dynamic
relationship between analysts and managers (Dirsmith & Covaleski, 1983) with managers
negotiating with analysts (Zhang & Gimeno, 2010) and successfully using impression
management tactics to positively influence analyst outputs (Fanelli et al., 2009; Washburn &
Bromiley, 2014; Westphal & Graebner, 2010).
Finally, within the management literature scholars use securities analysts as a
generalizable sample to empirically test micro-level organizational phenomenon such as job
transfers (Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008), changes in job roles (Groysberg & Lee, 2009),
evaluative outcomes (Bowers, in press), team dynamics (Groysberg, Polzer, & Elfenbein,
2011b), mimetic behaviors (Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001), social network effects (Burt, 2007),
competitive behavior among analysts (Bowers, Greve, Mitsuhashi, & Baum, 2014) and even the
theatricality of management presentations to analysts (Biehl‐Missal, 2011). These studies
highlight contingencies on analyst accuracy and forecasting behavior, such as category
membership (Bowers, in press), the resource endowments of their employers (Groysberg et al.,
2008), herding behaviors (Rao et al., 2001), competitive dynamics among analysts with similar
coverage (Bowers et al., 2014), and analyst access to diverse information (Burt, 2007).
Accuracy is critical to any model of analysts in organization science because much of their
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behavior, including their interface with managers, is motivated by their desire for accuracy
(Hong & Kubik, 2003; Ramnath et al., 2008).
In summary, management scholarship related to analysts grew out of a deep finance and
accounting literature and applied critical areas of strategic management to make significant
contributions to our understanding of the role of analysts in organizations, in particular as they
interface with managers. However, despite the appearance of a broad cross-disciplinary
understanding of analysts, I contend that we have only started to fully understand the nature of
the manager-analyst interface. Next, I will review the two dominant theoretical perspectives
used to understand the relationship between managers and analysts.

2.3 The Manager and Analyst Interface: The Agency Monitoring Perspective
The origins of analyst research in the finance and accounting literature highlight the role
analysts play in making private information publicly available and accessible, which ultimately
contributes to efficient security pricing. Investors look to analysts for accurate and impartial
information through their earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, and other verbal and
written assessments to help investors as they try to value firms and, more specifically, the future
value of managers’ investment decisions. Analysts provide investors with access to private
information (e.g. Bernhardt et al., 2006; Chan & Hameed, 2006; Clement & Tse, 2005; Healy &
Palepu, 2001; Lim, 2001) and combine that private information with external information,
historical outcomes and the analysts’ own expertise (Schipper, 1991) to develop forecasts and
make recommendations about the future prospects of the firm (Bradshaw, 2004). Ultimately,
analysts’ forecasts and stock recommendations do have a significant effect on stock price
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(Brown et al., 1985; Elton et al., 1981; Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996),
suggesting the information analysts provide investors shapes investor decision making.
This perspective largely invokes agency theory, such that ill-informed owners rely on
securities analysts to reduce the information asymmetry (Luo et al., 2015) that is inherent in the
owner-manager relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Analysts reduce this information
asymmetry by providing investors with private information (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Lim, 2001)
and serving as monitors over managerial performance by setting goals for managers (Gentry &
Shen, 2013) and monitoring managerial self-serving behavior (Irani, 2004; Wright et al., 2002).
Since analysts monitor managerial behavior and their goal as a monitor is to preserve shareholder
value, analysts elicit managerial behaviors aimed at meeting analysts’ forecasts each quarter to
demonstrate immediate shareholder return, such as cutting longer-horizon investments (Gentry &
Shen, 2013; Graham et al., 2005), making short-term competitive decisions (Zhang & Gimeno,
2010), and repurchasing shares (Benner & Ranganathan, 2012; Sanders & Carpenter, 2003).
The agency perspective of analysts as information intermediaries and monitors also
qualifies and provides a more nuanced understanding of the analyst-manager interface. There
are contextual moderators, such as industry uncertainty, that change the importance of
information to investors (e.g. Conroy & Harris, 1987) and, subsequently, either strengthen or
weaken analysts’ relevance to managers. Furthermore, there is evidence that unobservable
information predominantly drives analysts’ recommendations and valuations (e.g. Bell, 1984;
Koch & Cebula, 1994) and, because this often represents private information from managers
(Healy & Palepu, 2001), it has more value to investors. Finally, analyst biases account for
variance in the quality of the information analysts provide investors and the rigor of their
monitoring efforts over managers. Specifically, optimism biases in analyst forecasts emerge (De
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Bondt & Thaler, 1990; Schipper, 1991) as analysts seek to retain access to private information
channels to maintain their relative accuracy (Lim, 2001), attract retail investors to invest through
their brokerage firm (Irvine, 2004), and ultimately achieve favorable career outcomes (e.g.
Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2012; Hong & Kubik, 2003; Stickel, 1995).

2.4 The Manager-Analyst Interface: The Institutional Perspective
Grounded in their significant influence over investors, institutional theorists have argued
that analysts have developed as powerful institutions that confer legitimacy upon firms and their
managers (Navis & Glynn, 2010; Zuckerman, 1999). Some have built off of the monitoring role
of analysts, combining it with tenets of institutional theory to evolve a theory of analysts as
legitimate monitors (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011), suggesting analysts have monitoring power in
their own right and do not always monitor consistent with investor interests. Mimetic forces
have reinforced this institutional treatment of analysts through routines and infrastructure geared
at perpetuating the manager-analyst relationship (Rao & Sivakumar, 1999). This institutional
perspective of analysts explains why managers make substantial strategic decisions that do not
necessarily contribute to shareholder value and are more consistent with industry-aligned analyst
interests than diversified owner interests, such as divestment (Zuckerman, 2000), highly focused
strategies (Nicolai et al., 2010), competitively undifferentiated strategies (Litov et al., 2012),
delayed adoption of innovative technologies (Benner, 2010), and share repurchase (Benner &
Ranganathan, 2012; Sanders & Carpenter, 2003).
In addition to studying significant strategic actions managers take to be consistent with
analyst preferences, management scholars have also used institutional theory to capture
defensive actions undertaken by managers in an attempt to maintain legitimacy among analysts.
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Legitimacy-protecting managers engage with analysts in an attempt to shape their assessments of
the firm by rendering favors (Westphal & Clement, 2008), using overly optimistic rhetoric
(Fanelli et al., 2009), and appeasing analysts with symbolic strategic actions (Westphal &
Graebner, 2010).

2.5 Summary and Assessment
Agency and institutional theory have driven two dominant perspectives of securities
analysts in scholarly research - analysts as information suppliers and monitors and analysts as a
legitimacy-bestowing institution. These perspectives are related, both holding up analysts as
powerful institutional monitors and assuming a relatively deferential role for managers in their
relationship with analysts. Despite work that acknowledges some reciprocity between managers
and analysts from negotiation-like interactions (Cotter et al., 2006; Zhang & Gimeno, 2010) to
impression management and persuasive tactics that change analyst outputs (Fanelli et al., 2009;
Washburn & Bromiley, 2014; Westphal & Clement, 2008; Westphal & Graebner, 2010), within
the management literature there is still an assumption that managers are acting deferentially with
respect to analysts.
The work done to date on the agency and institutional perspectives of analysts has
focused on the need analyst coverage meets for owners. The additional monitoring analysts
provide should reduce agency costs, leading more-highly-covered firms to outperform their
lesser-covered or non-covered peers. Likewise, the institutional status of analysts should confer
legitimacy benefits to firms, ultimately resulting in investor confidence and firm access to
capital. With strict focus on the benefits of analyst coverage to owners, both perspectives imply
positive performance effects of analyst coverage. Yet empirical tests of these theories stop short
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of testing this relationship to performance. Furthermore, business leaders (e.g. Turner, 2005) and
the media (e.g. New, September 24, 2012) have long lamented the role capital markets and their
intermediaries play in depleting firm value by placing excessive emphasis on earnings at the
expense of firm operating performance and long term value. Taken together these observations
suggest that analysts likely have a more tenuous relationship with firm value than is currently
represented in existing models of security analysts.
Furthermore, it may not be accurate to assume analysts maintain a controlling influence
over managerial behavior even if their profession developed to fill that role. Analysts emerged
as a profession in the 1980’s to give guidance and voice to the growing ranks of individual
investors (Useem, 1996) who did not have the knowledge or concentrated influence to challenge
managers. However, the growing body of work that recognizes a more dynamic relationship
between managers and analysts (Westphal & Clement, 2008; Westphal & Graebner, 2010)
suggests analyst behavior may be as malleable as managerial behavior. Moreover, finance and
accounting scholars highlight a critical tool that managers use to actively engage with analysts.
Private information from managers plays a critical role in shaping analyst’s forecasts and
recommendations (Bernhardt et al., 2006; Chan & Hameed, 2006; Clement & Tse, 2005; Lim,
2001) but is difficult to observe and directly measure (Core, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Lang
& Lundholm, 1993). This evidence suggests managers have both the potential and tools to
engage in an active exchange with analysts.
In the next chapter, I explore a more active role for managers with respect to analysts,
using a more holistic application of agency theory to the manager-analyst relationship by
incorporating agency-bonding arguments to explain the motivation behind the interdependence
of managers and analysts. Specifically, I will examine analysts as monitors, directing the
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attention of investors, either toward or away from self-interested agent manager behavior.
Managers, in an attempt to further their self-interested pursuits, bond with monitoring analysts
by offering them access to management and internal operations.
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CHAPTER 3: AGENT MANAGERS AND MONITORING ANALYSTS

3.1 Agency Theory
Agency theory deals with the tension between principals and agents, most often applied
to the owner-manager contract. Investors are principals who contract with specialized managers,
the agents, to run a particular firm and make firm-level decisions on their behalf (Fama &
Jensen, 1983a). In an agency relationship, tension between principals and agents emerges,
resulting from information asymmetry, divergent interests and different risk preferences
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Principal investors seek to increase their residual claims (Fama & Jensen,
1983a) while their agents are more focused on self-interested outcomes (Williamson, 1985) such
as building a reputation and enduring legacy (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991) and maximizing
personal utility, including employment security and personal wealth (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia,
1998).
Principals can address agent self-serving behavior with the threat of changing agents or
by deploying monitoring and incentive alignment tools such as hierarchies (Fama & Jensen,
1983a), boards of directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983b) and incentive structures (Dushnitsky &
Shapira, 2010; Tosi, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 1997) that try to limit managerial self-interested
behavior and associated residual losses. The former is more common where transaction costs are
low while the latter is more common with higher transaction costs often found in labor contracts
(Jensen, 1983; Williamson, 1985). While agents have incentive to validate their efficacy to
owners to reduce the threat of agent change, agents facing monitoring and incentive alignment
programs also have incentive to minimize the impact of those programs.
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Agents engage in bonding activities (e.g., contractual guarantees, behavioral guarantees,
voluntary limits on decision-making) in an attempt to limit the need for and effectiveness of
owner monitoring and incentive structures (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Even further, there is
evidence that agent managers actively work to manipulate monitoring mechanisms (Harris &
Bromiley, 2007). This managerial activism and bonding involves concessions, which reduce the
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits managers derive from their employment (e.g., increased
workload, riskier employment and riskier compensation). However, there are benefits to
bonding as it provides more optimal outcomes for managers in terms of their ability to act in
self-interested ways given owner monitoring efforts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In essence,
bonding can be viewed as a form of insurance (Mahoney, 2005), whereby the agent is sacrificing
a portion of their short-term utility to sustain or “insure” losses on that same utility in the future.

3.2 Agent Managers and Managerial Self-interested Behavior
The agency theoretic principal-agent problem is often applied to owners and managers,
whereby these two parties have divergent self-interests that inform their interactions and their
individual behavior (Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). When a decision places owner
value-maximizing goals at odds with managers’ self-interests, managers have to make a choice
regarding the nature of their decision. Self-interest motivates managers to engage in self-serving
behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, there is also evidence that managers tend to behave in a
way such that they maximize their behavior relative to expectations (Sakhartov & Folta, 2013).
Together these observations suggest that managers are managing toward owner expectations but,
given an opportunity such as low owner visibility, managers will take advantage of self-serving
opportunities when they arise. Consistent with this perspective, there is evidence that managers
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are likely to pursue self-interested behavior when it is difficult for investors to monitor their
decisions (Amihud & Lev, 1981).
Risk aversion is a form of self-interest most often addressed in the agency literature as a
way to ensure employment stability and personal wealth (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Wiseman &
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The conflict of interests arises because managers prefer risk-averse
behaviors and investments to maintain employment and financial security but owners are riskneutral (Eisenhardt, 1989). Even though risky decisions may add value to the firm, managers
prefer cautious or risk-averse decisions, which are often not consistent with owners’ valuemaximizing goals. In addition to their interest in preserving their wealth and employment, there
is evidence that top executives are also interested building their legacy (Hambrick & Fukutomi,
1991; Matta & Beamish, 2008) and amassing power (Baldenius et al., 2014). These selfinterested tendencies can be realized through financial slack or reserves, as managers try to
protect the firm against any large losses and maintain excess resources for investments of their
choice (Jensen, 1986; O'Brien, 2003).
Considering the prior observation that managers have more opportunity to express their
self-interested tendencies when investors are not able to closely monitor manager decisions, it is
likely that a self-interested behavior, such as amassing financial reserves, is more likely to
happen when this activity is less visible to owners. Industry-specific accounting-based activity is
of particularly low visibility to investors. The parallel between accounting activity and visibility
is most evident in the literature on earnings management, whereby managers use accounting
actions (e.g., drawing down reserves, postponing an accounting charge) to manipulate or
“manage” earnings to project stronger earnings per share results to the external market than truly
underlie the financial position of the firm (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). While recent accounting
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scandals have led to more scrutiny over accounting actions toward earnings management from
professionals or industry insiders, such as auditors and securities analysts, these accounting
actions are still largely not well understood by the average investor (Graham et al., 2005). On
the other hand, “real” actions (e.g., decreasing R&D spending, delaying a new project,
repurchasing shares) are a broadly visible and more easily understood alternatives to managing
earnings (Graham et al., 2005). Thus, while investors understand when managers cut costs
associated with R&D or advertising to increase earnings in the short-term, investors are less
likely to detect changes in accounting behavior used to manage earnings.
As information intermediaries (Luo et al., 2015), analysts are more likely than investors
to detect earnings management behaviors (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Hirst & Hopkins, 1998).
Evidence shows that among all non-management groups knowledgeable about firm-level
strategy, analysts are most accurate in their understanding of industry-specific firm level strategy
(Chen et al., 1993). However, analysts can exercise discretion in how much they choose to draw
attention to managerial accounting actions (Johnston, Leone, Ramnath, & Yang, 2012)1,
particularly industry-specific accounting actions where managers and industry-aligned analysts
have specialized expertise (Groysberg & Lee, 2009; Zuckerman, 2000) but investors do not.
Thus, in the domain of industry-specific accounting actions, both managers and analysts have
more flexibility and discretion because these actions are not as visible to most investors.
In the next section I will discuss the role analysts play in the agency relationship between
managers and owners, in particular their role in drawing owner attention toward or away from
self-interested managerial behavior.

1

These authors found evidence that analysts often do not adjust forecasts for unusual 14 week quarters. They conclude this is the result of
intentional or unintentional ignorance. While they tend to lean toward ineptitude as the explanation for individual analysts, they point toward the
role of intentional choice when considering patterns in consensus errors, which is the level of analysis of focus here.
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3.3 Analysts Monitor Managerial Behavior
Securities analysts are often considered to be an external monitoring mechanism over
managerial behavior (Gentry & Shen, 2013; Wright et al., 2002). In addition to internal controls,
such as boards (Fama & Jensen, 1983b) and incentive alignment programs (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Tosi et al., 1997) aimed at minimizing managerial agency costs, there are external parties, such
as the capital market and its participants, that also play an exogenous role in controlling agency
costs (Wright et al., 2002). In their seminal work that contributes to our current understanding of
the owner-manager agency relationship and associated agency costs, Jensen & Meckling (1976)
note that, even though securities analysts are external to the firms they cover, they should reduce
residual agency costs incurred by owners, which Jensen & Meckling attribute specifically to the
analysts’ role in monitoring managerial behavior.
Analysts monitor managers by setting clear expectations for managers and applying
industry expertise toward analyzing managerial decisions. Owners are not in position to perform
these monitoring functions because many owners may have many different expectations and they
lack expertise. Dispersed ownership exacerbates agency costs (Berle & Means, 1991 [1932])
because owner monitoring becomes ineffective when managers are unable to discern clear
performance expectations. Furthermore, public owners are most often ill-informed owners, such
that they do not have comprehensive knowledge of the firm or industry in which they have taken
ownership. Owners have hired professional managers because of the managers’ expertise,
underscoring owners’ information deficit when it comes to developing expectations and
adequately assessing behavior towards expectations. Evidence shows analyst recommendations
are most accurate when looking within industry (Boni & Womack, 2006; Groysberg & Lee,
2009), even attributing positive value to firm managers who maintain industry alignment
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(Zuckerman, 1999). Analysts use this industry expertise to develop subjective perceptions and
heuristics that guide their assessments of the future value of the firm (Bradshaw, 2004).
Furthermore, analysts are the most accurate outside strategy informant (Chen et al., 1993),
highlighting their firm-specific expertise. Thus, not only do analysts consolidate the voices of
investors by setting clear goals for managers, they also filter and synthesize information using
their industry expertise.
As monitors, analysts fill some of the gaps inherent in public ownership by setting clear
expectations and holding managers accountable to these goals through their recommendations.
Specifically, analyst forecasts set visible and measurable expectations for owners to benchmark
managers against while recommendations assist in evaluating managerial performance and
decision-making overall. The behavioral agency model points out that managers are motivated
by employment security and wealth accumulation (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Since
analysts create clear, informed expectations that are connected to managers accomplishing these
personal goals, then goal-setting theory holds managerial behavior will be directed toward
meeting these expectations (Locke & Latham, 2002). Consistent with this assumption that
analyst expectations are salient to managerial employment outcomes and personal wealth, there
is evidence that negative analyst forecasts and recommendations lead to turnover among top
managers (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011) and that analyst coverage more
strongly links managerial compensation to shareholder returns (Wright et al., 2002). Thus, as
monitors for owners, analysts draw owner attention to poor firm performance with low forecasts
and negative recommendations (Westphal & Clement, 2008; Zhang & Gimeno, 2010) and set
clear performance goals for managers with their forecasts (Gentry & Shen, 2013; Washburn &
Bromiley, 2014).
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3.4 Analyst Forecast Optimism
Analysts play a critical information intermediary role in capital markets, controlling the
visibility and evaluative quality of managerial behavior. Thus, when analysts’ earnings forecasts
are pessimistic it projects low confidence in management and draws investor attention to
managerial behavior (Westphal & Clement, 2008; Zhang & Gimeno, 2010). Pessimistic
earnings forecasts, with the scrutiny they draw from investors, do not provide a favorable
environment for managers to exercise self-interested behavior.
Managers, however, do not view optimistic forecasts as universally favorable either.
Scholars often characterize the manager and analyst interaction as a negotiation (Zhang &
Gimeno, 2010) whereby managers want lower forecast targets to avoid missing an earning
benchmark (Graham et al., 2005) and analysts want the most accurate forecasts to maximize their
performance incentives (e.g. Hong & Kubik, 2003). Managers provide a range of public
information, including press releases, conference calls, and earnings guidance (Charoenrook &
Lewis, 2009; Washburn & Bromiley, 2014). The content of these public disclosures, in
particular earnings guidance, is intended to place pressure on analysts to reduce overly optimistic
forecasts (Cotter et al., 2006) because missing targets draws attention to managerial actions
whereas meeting or exceeding targets does not (Graham et al., 2005). This suggests that
managers prefer forecasts that are not overly optimistic because overly optimistic forecasts set
expectations for which managers will be held accountable. Given that managers maximize their
behavior relative to expectations (Sakhartov & Folta, 2013), with high expectations they have
less opportunity to maximize their self-interested behavior.
Together, these observations suggest that analyst forecasts are favorable for managers to
engage in self-interested behavior when these forecasts are increasingly optimistic, but this effect
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dampens at high levels of optimism. Analysts set year-end and, typically, quarterly forecasts
along a range of financial metrics at the start of a fiscal year, making modifications to these
forecasts throughout the fiscal year. I focus specifically on earnings per share (“EPS”) because
of the emphasis both analysts (Ramnath et al., 2008) and managers (Graham et al., 2005) place
on this particular financial metric. Optimism in analyst forecasts can be detected by looking at
the difference between EPS forecasts at the start of the year and actual EPS results at the end of
the year of the prior year. Positive differences indicate analysts, as a group, are projecting
optimism, while negative differences indicate they are projecting pessimism.
Given these arguments, I expect forecast optimism to have a non-linear relationship with
managerial self-interested behavior. Managers will increase their self-interested behavior as
analysts issue more optimistic forecasts because increasing optimism in analyst forecasts lessens
the burden of investor attention over managerial behavior. However, this relationship is not as
strong at higher levels of optimism where overly optimistic targets set high performance targets
for managers, forcing them to temper their self-interested behavior.

Hypothesis 1: Analyst forecast optimism has a quadratic relationship with managerial
self-interested behavior such that the positive relationship between
optimism and self-interested behavior flattens at high levels of optimism.

3.5 The Moderating Effect of Firm Performance
To test the strength of the relationship I developed between monitoring analysts and
agent managers, I consider the goals of a common party: investor owners. Owner goals are
centered on value-maximizing firm performance. Agent managers are expected to maintain
adequate firm performance and analysts are expected to identify adequate firm performance,
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calling out managerial self-interested behavior through their forecasts and recommendations.
Earlier I explained the role of analysts in directing investor attention. However, actual results
can also direct investor attention. When firm performance is strong investors do not have reason
to scrutinize managerial self-interested behavior, particularly when analysts are also offering a
positive outlook through optimistic forecasts.
Under conditions where owner goals are not passably met (i.e., firm performance is
inadequate), investors are more likely to direct their attention to managerial behavior and agent
managers are likely to make concessions on their self-interests to focus on owner goals
(Aaldering, Greer, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2013). Highlighting the foundational role of owner
expectations, managers tend to maximize their behavior relative to expectations (Sakhartov &
Folta, 2013) because missing expectations puts managers at increased risk of losing their jobs.
Thus, stabilizing firm performance becomes more important than trying to maximize personal
utility from their employment. There is evidence that managers exercise less discretion when
firms are experiencing financial hardships (Petroni, 1992). Furthermore, managers have less
slack so they do not have the ability to exercise discretion (Hart, 1983). This evidence suggests
that managers curb their self-interested behavior when firm performance is weak because
investors are paying close attention to their behavior and they have little slack to use selfinterestedly.
Similarly, firm performance is critical to analyst job security. Analysts looking to attract
new investors and retain their current customer base (Irvine, 2004) depend on positive
performance in the stocks they cover, even sometimes limiting their coverage to firms about
which they have optimistic views (McNichols & O'Brien, 1997). Thus, a drop in firm
performance can impair the relationships analysts have with their investor customers. This
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suggests that analysts will be stricter monitors when firm performance is weak, placing added
downward pressure on managerial self-interested behavior.
If analysts are stricter monitors when firm performance is weak and managers ignore
their self-interests when firm performance is weak then managerial self-interested behavior
should be suppressed when performance is weak compared to when firm performance is strong.
Furthermore, the effect of forecast optimism on managerial self-interested behavior should be
weaker among low-performing firms as managers shift their attention away from changes in
analyst forecasts and toward meeting owner expectations. On the other hand, as firms perform
better, investors are not as attentive, particularly when analysts are also optimistic, having a
multiplicative effect on managers’ ability to be self-interested. These observations suggest that
firm performance has a strengthening effect on the relationship between analyst forecast
optimism and managerial self-interested behavior.

Hypothesis 2: Firm performance strengthens the relationship between analyst forecast
optimism and managerial self-interested behavior.

3.6 The Bond Managers Create with Analysts
3.6.1 Analysts and private information. Despite their profession emerging to fill several critical
monitoring functions for investors, analysts also can act self-interestedly, sometimes in ways that
conflict with investor interests. Analysts’ self-interested goals include employment stability
(Groysberg, Healy, & Maber, 2011a), professional recognition (Stickel, 1992), power among
their peers (Groysberg et al., 2008; Rao et al., 2001), career advancement (Cohen et al., 2012),
and commissions (Irvine, 2004). These goals are most likely achieved when they are routinely
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accurate in their outputs (Groysberg et al., 2011a; Hong & Kubik, 2003; Ramnath et al., 2008).
However, accuracy is challenging for analysts due to the uncertainty of future earnings streams
(Bradshaw, 2004). Gathering information to reduce this uncertainty is challenging and costly for
analysts (Feldman et al., 2014), providing them with incentive to directly seek information from
managers that would help inform forecasts regarding future earnings.
There is evidence that analyst optimism reinforces open information channels (Das,
Levine, & Sivaramakrishnan, 1998; De Bondt & Thaler, 1990), suggesting analysts are
motivated to be optimistic to gain information from managers. However, it is not as clear why
managers would relinquish information that analysts could ultimately use against them. The next
section addresses this gap using agency-bonding arguments. I will argue that managers offer
analysts unique access to firm executives and operations to bond with them, knowing the
importance analysts place on accessing private information.

3.6.2 Managerial bonding through accessibility. Using agency theoretic bonding arguments in
an effort to preserve some of the utility agent managers draw from their employment, managers
will expend bonding costs directed toward monitoring efforts to reduce the effectiveness or
intensity of the monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Analysts are intermediaries positioned
squarely between owners and managers (Harris & Souder, 2004; Luo et al., 2015), operating as
relevant managerial monitors (Wright et al., 2002) but also accessible to managers as well.
Given the relevance of analysts as monitors and their intermediary position, managers are likely
to incur some bonding costs to reduce the intensity of analyst monitoring, which should allow
managers to pursue their self-interested goals.
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One such bonding mechanism managers have at their disposal that is meaningful to
analysts is information disclosure. Managers have identified analysts as their target audience for
the majority of the disclosures they make (Graham et al., 2005). Through disclosures, managers
are actively trying to shape analyst perceptions (Healy & Palepu, 2001) and analysts ascribe
value to information from managers (Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999). However, analysts are
aware of the conservatism in public information provided by managers (Cotter et al., 2006) and,
moreover, investors are also aware, leading analysts to over-adjust their forecasts to compensate
for investor knowledge (Löffler, 1998). Since incorporating public information does not allow
analysts to provide unique value to investors, this evidence suggests that public managerial
disclosures are not beneficial to either managers or analysts.
Analysts typically balance public information received from managers with their own
segment research (Healy et al., 1999), prior experience with management disclosures (Williams,
1996), and, in particular, unobservable private sources of information (Bernhardt et al., 2006;
Chan & Hameed, 2006; Clement & Tse, 2005; Lim, 2001). Specifically, the forward-looking
component of analyst outputs is the most subjective (Bradshaw, 2004), and private information
from managers improves accuracy on this component (Barron, Kile, & O'Keefe, 1999). Thus, it
is in the private domain that information yields benefit to analysts by allowing them to use this
information to differentiate their forecasts, potentially garnering professional recognition and
wealth (CFA Institute, May 28, 2008; Hong & Kubik, 2003).
In a post RegFD environment selective disclosure on the part of managers is no longer
allowed, resulting in curtailment of overt managerial private disclosures to analysts (Agrawal et
al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2010). Thus, I instead focus on managerial accessibility, a less overt
form of private disclosure whereby managers allow analysts access to management and internal
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operations but the analysts must use the private evidence gleaned from this transparency to draw
their own conclusions. Indeed there are indicators that it is precisely this type of transparency –
management tone, informal conversations, observations of facilities and operations – that
analysts seek to accurately develop their forecasts and recommendations (Hershberg, 2012).
Therefore, managers can bond with analysts by being accessible to analysts.
Bonding involves the agent incurring some cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and being
accessible invites costs associated with added scrutiny. In a survey of executives, Graham and
colleagues (2005) found that managers have personal concerns about disclosing information to
analysts, including challenges to managers’ careers and reputations and setting a precedent for
future disclosures that will exacerbate and extend the aforementioned personal costs of
disclosure. An informed analyst can levy more consequential challenges to top managers’
judgment and ability, resulting in negative employment (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Wiersema &
Zhang, 2011) and compensation outcomes (Wright et al., 2002). However, an uniformed
analyst is likely to be more pessimistic (Lim, 2001), depleting investor confidence in managerial
behavior.
Thus, despite the risks and costs associated with managerial accessibility, and even in a
post-RegFD environment, managers are motivated to bond with analysts to lessen the impact of
analyst monitoring and develop a longer-term productive relationship with analysts. By being
accessible to analysts, managers not only guide analysts’ outputs but also accumulate goodwill
with analysts who use the private information they glean toward their own self-interests.

3.6.3. Analyst forecast optimism and managerial accessibility. Managers are more likely to
bond with analysts who issue forecasts that managers perceive as favorable because managers
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are more likely to take on the costs of bonding with analysts when they ascribe personal benefit
to analyst forecast optimism. Recognizing the managerial motivation for providing access, there
is evidence that desire for managerial accessibility motivates analysts’ forecast optimism.
Specifically, analysts underreact to negative information because attaining or maintaining
management access is critical (Lim, 2001).
In summary, managers recognize that analysts have self-interests, in particular analysts
desire access to management and internal operations, and managers will bond with analysts
along their self-interests by increasing the accessibility of these potentially rich information
sources for analysts. Furthermore, managers are more motivated to bond with analysts when
analysts are issuing favorable forecasts. Again, forecasts are favorable when they are optimistic,
but this effect dampens when forecasts are overly optimistic, again indicating that forecast
optimism has a non-linear relationship with managerial accessibility.

Hypothesis 3: Analyst forecast optimism has a quadratic relationship with managerial
accessibility such that the positive relationship between optimism and
accessibility gets flatter at high levels of optimism.

3.7 Summary of the Agency-theoretic Approach to the Manager-Analyst Interface
To this point I have extended the agency perspective on the relationship between
managers and analysts to argue that their interactions are fueled by a bonding choice, whereby
managers are choosing to be accessible, inviting additional scrutiny over their own behavior, to
preserve their self-interests. Moreover, managers are more likely to bond with analysts when
analysts are issuing favorable forecasts. Specifically, managers consider forecasts that are
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optimistic as favorable because pessimistic forecasts invite investor scrutiny that limits
managers’ ability to pursue their self-interested goals. But this positive relationship between
optimistic forecasts and managerial self-interested behavior dampens when forecasts are overly
optimistic because these forecasts effectively set high targets that managers are forced to manage
toward encroaching on their ability to act self-interestedly. Furthermore, when firm performance
is strong and analysts are optimistic, investors have little reason to scrutinize managerial
behavior. When firm performance is weak, investors will likely pay attention to managerial
behavior regardless of analysts’ forecasts. Together these arguments suggest that firm
performance strengthens the positive relationship between analyst forecast optimism and
managerial self-interested behavior.
Through this agency perspective, when analysts are strictly monitoring managerial
behavior they will revise their forecasts to accurately reflect all information, calling attention to
self-interested behaviors. However, when analysts are currying favor with managers to attain
access analysts are less likely to reflect self-interested behavior in their forecasts, reducing the
visibility of, and even validating, managerial behavior to owners, thereby providing managers
with the opportunity to engage in self-interested behavior and the incentive to bond with analysts
by providing the accessibility they desire. This suggests that manager and analyst self-interested
goals, while different, are interdependent, motivating a private interface between managers and
analysts.
Furthermore, the bonding relationship I developed is not compulsory – it is selfmotivated and contingent on the associated costs. When managers are accessible to analysts they
risk added scrutiny over their discretionary behaviors. Thus, the motivation to engage in
bonding is contingent on the expectation of reciprocity. Without reciprocity, the bond breaks

36

down, as managers are not motivated to bond, highlighting the social dilemma involved in these
interactions.
Indeed, this type of opportunistic interdependence is very risky for both managers and
analysts and not well documented empirically in the management literature (von Werder, 2011).
In the next section, I respond to von Werder’s (2011) call for a more concrete understanding of
self-interested options between stakeholder groups by further developing this model of the
manager-analyst interface. Specifically, I will use game-theoretic reasoning to capture real
constraints placed on the agency model of the manager-analyst interface, maintaining the
underlying agency ideas of self-interest and bonding but incorporating mutual dependence
between managers and analysts using game-theoretic concepts of reciprocity and assurance.
With indicators that managers are engaged with analysts more fully than the literature captures
(Hershberg, 2012; Turner, 2005), I develop this game-theoretic contingent model of agency
theory consistent with work calling for models that incorporate contextual realities (Harris et al.,
2013).
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CHAPTER 4: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH TO THE MANAGER AND
ANALYST INTERFACE

4.1 Application of Game-theoretic Reasoning to the Manager-Analyst Interface
“Game theoretic modeling is the appropriate tool when studying strategic interactions
between agents with differing goals” (Saloner, 1991: 128-129). As discussed in the prior
chapter, agency theory is based on the premise that owners of public firms are dispersed and illinformed, so they hire agent managers to make decisions on their behalf and enlist analysts to
inform their ownership holdings, effectively giving analysts monitoring power over managerial
actions and decisions. In order to reduce the restrictive power monitoring has on their selfinterests, managers have the incentive to engage in bonding activities with analysts, highlighting
the interdependence of manager and analyst self interests. Specifically, the utility managers
receive from making self-interested decisions depends on analysts’ assessments of those
decisions. Likewise, analyst self-interests depend on private firm-level information made
accessible to them by managers. Thus, with highly interdependent goals, the interaction between
managers and analysts is appropriate to consider using game-theoretic reasoning.
Consistent with Postrel’s (1991) recommendation, I use game-theoretic reasoning as a
tool to illustrate my arguments and place constraints on current theory, not as a strategic
management theory itself. Specifically, game-theoretic reasoning organizes and shapes existing
theory on managers and analysts as they interact. Agency theory provides an understanding of
why the manager-analyst relationship emerged and how managers’ and analysts’ actions are
interdependent. While agency theory illuminates the bonding mechanism underlying the
interaction between managers and analysts, it falls short of capturing the dominant motivation for
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managers to bond in the first place. Game-theoretic reasoning contributes by placing
interdependent constraints on manager and analyst interactions, both incorporating their
expectation of the others’ reciprocity. In other words, how do managers behave, given their
expectations about how analysts will behave? Furthermore, game-theoretic reasoning informs
the salient equilibrium points for these strategic interactions (Camerer, 1991), contributing to our
understanding of the magnitude of relative payoffs for managers.

4.2 Reciprocity
Game-theoretic analysis addresses social dilemmas where players are making decisions
that affect both their own individual outcome and the collective outcome of all players in the
game. A key tenet of any of these social dilemmas is that the players’ outcomes are
interdependent. Because the other player’s outcome will affect their own, each player has to
make assumptions about what they believe their counterpart will do. They look ahead to all
possible outcome combinations and reason backwards to make their decision, considering how
the other player will respond along the way (Camerer, 1991; Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991). Thus, the
expectation of the type of reciprocity, either exchanging mutually beneficial resources or both
withholding those resources, guides each player’s decision process (Parkhe, 1993).
This suggests that managers likely let their payoffs inform their decisions (see Figure 2),
such that their payoffs provide a feedback loop to their subsequent decision-making. Moreover,
repeated interactions (Arend & Seale, 2005) and past experience together (Chatain, 2011;
Saloner, 1991) inform each player’s subsequent decision to cooperate or not. Thus, regardless
of who activates the exchange between managers and analysts, since each builds positive
experience by accumulating benefits from the interaction they are more likely to engage by
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reciprocating with a behavior that provides the other with a benefit (Agarwal, Anand, Bercovitz,
& Croson, 2012). This suggests the access managers provide analysts is at least partially
dependent on the benefit or loss they are experiencing in their self-interested behavior.
Earlier I argued that favorable forecasts are positively related to accessibility with
managers ascribing value to favorable forecasts because they expect to see a benefit to their selfinterested behavior. Here I refine that relationship based on the forces of reciprocity and realized
benefit for managers. Optimistic forecasts are only related to managerial accessibility when
managers realize a benefit to their self-interested behavior, attributing that benefit to the
optimistic forecasts and reciprocating with access. This suggests a fully mediated model, as the
effect of optimistic forecasts on accessibility is fully mediated by the actual self-interested
behavior manager’s realized:

Hypothesis 4: Managerial self-interested behavior fully mediates the relationship
between analyst forecast optimism and managerial accessibility.

4.3 Assurance Games
While reciprocity is a characteristic relevant to a range of game-theoretic analyses of
cooperation (Axelrod, 2006 [1984]), there are different types of social dilemmas that lead to
different outcomes. The most common social dilemma game is the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
However, several authors have argued that assurance games are more prevalent and accurate
models of social dilemmas than Prisoner’s Dilemma games (Agarwal et al., 2012; Agarwal et al.,
2010; Kollock, 1998) because assurance games allow for multiple equilibrium outcomes where
coordination among players leads to the best individual and collective outcomes. In this section,
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I will distinguish between a cooperation game and a coordination game, highlighting the critical
distinctions. Then, I will use these criteria to argue that managers and analysts are most often
engaged in an assurance game informing the magnitude of the payoffs they are able to realize.

4.3.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma vs. The Stag Hunt. To understand the relevance of assurance
game-theoretic reasoning to the manager-analyst interface, it is helpful to distinguish the more
widely known Prisoner’s Dilemma game from the Stag Hunt, an assurance game (for a detailed
discussion on the differences between prisoner’s dilemma and assurance games see Agarwal et
al., 2010; Kollock, 1998). The Prisoner’s Dilemma game addresses the specific issue of
cooperation – should I cooperate with the other player or should I defect (not cooperate)? The
assumption in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is that by cooperating both players are sacrificing
some of their individual payoff to reach the cooperative outcome, and if the other does not
choose to cooperate, then the player that cooperated will have the worst possible payoff. Thus,
in a typical prisoner’s dilemma game, the rational individual behavior is to defect because it is
only when a player defects that they avoid the worst outcome. There is single equilibrium where
both players defect because the payoffs are structured such that the largest payoff to a single
player comes when that player defects and the other cooperates, followed by mutual cooperation,
then mutual defection, and, finally, when the focal player cooperates while the other defects.
Different than a cooperative game, an assurance game is really a coordination game,
which changes the relative value of the individual payoffs (Kollock, 1998). While cooperation
involves trading off individual outcomes for the good of the collective outcome by working
together, coordination is organizing different activities toward more effective outcomes for each
individual. Specifically in the Stag Hunt game, an assurance game, players are choosing to hunt
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a stag or a hare. The two individuals need to coordinate their decisions in order to effectively
hunt the stag, which is the largest payoff for both. An individual can instead choose to hunt the
hare and receive a certain, but significantly smaller, payoff. If one individual chooses to hunt the
hare, and the other the stag, the one that chooses the stag will get nothing and the one that
chooses the hare will have an easier time hunting a hare because no one else is also trying to hunt
the hare. Thus, in a coordination game the outcome with the highest payoff to both players is the
outcome where players have coordinated their activities switching the relative value of the top
two outcomes in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Now mutual coordination yields the highest
payoff, providing incentive for both players coordinate.
Furthermore, in assurance games there are multiple equilibria. Creating the name of this
game, players will coordinate as long as they are assured that the other will coordinate, thus
mutual coordination is an equilibrium outcome with the maximum payoffs for both. However,
absent assurance, mutual defection, the only equilibrium in a prisoner’s dilemma, is also an
equilibrium outcome as both players can minimize their risk. The former is known as the
payoff-dominant strategy and the latter is known as the risk-dominant strategy (Harsanyi &
Selten, 1988). The key issue in an assurance game is trust; thus, these types of games are also
known as trust dilemmas. Players can signal assurance by posting an economic bond (Mahoney,
2005) or making a persuasive commitment (Schelling, 2011) and hoping the other player will
reciprocate. In line with the earlier discussion on reciprocity, if they do reciprocate the players
will converge on the coordination outcome as both players become assured the other will
coordinate their activities. If the other player does not reciprocate, they will converge on the
mutual defection outcome because the original player is unlikely to be willing to post that
economic bond again.
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McAdams (2008) provides an effective example that highlights the difference between
cooperation and coordination games using the prisoner’s dilemma. In the straightforward
Prisoner’s Dilemma the cooperative outcome is defined by both prisoners keeping quiet so they
serve minimal jail time. However, when the evidence against them is weak and a strong alibi
would set them both free the relative payoffs are rearranged because they each could achieve
their best payoff by coordinating. As long as they coordinate in confirming each other’s alibi
then each can maximize their payoff and go free.
To this point I have demonstrated that an assurance game, like Stag Hunt, is more
applicable than the cooperative prisoner’s dilemma game under two basic conditions. First,
when coordination between the players yields the best individual payoff to each player, then an
assurance game is most appropriate. Second, there must be a path to that coordinated outcome.
In other words, assurance must be possible between the players. This is possible when each
player can post a bond by making a commitment that is both meaningful to the other player, and
detrimental to the player posting the bond absent reciprocation from the other player. Next, I
will demonstrate that these conditions can be found in the interaction between managers and
analysts.

4.3.2 Managers and analysts in an assurance game. Consider again McAdams’ (2008)
modified prisoner’s dilemma story in context of managers and analysts. Like the prosecutors in
the second scenario, dispersed owners have a “weak case” against managers and analysts, such
that they are relatively ill-informed – unable to monitor managerial behavior and unable to
ensure analyst monitoring is effective. In this situation, analysts and managers can effectively
coordinate their behaviors to maximize their individual outcomes such that analysts validate

43

managerial behavior through optimistic forecasts and managers help enlighten analysts by
providing analysts internal access. Managers and analysts are engaged in a social dilemma
because they have these highly-interdependent outcomes. In particular, as the parallel is drawn
with McAdam’s illustration of an assurance game, managers and analysts can choose to
coordinate their behaviors to maximize their individual payoffs.
The behaviors that managers and analysts are coordinating must be relevant to the other
player, difficult for the committing player to undertake and difficult for the receiving player to
assess the magnitude (Schelling, 2011). Both managers and analysts have the ability to give
relevant assurances to the other player that benefit the other and cost themselves. When
managers are accessible to analysts, analysts benefit but managers place themselves at risk for
added scrutiny. When analysts adjust forecasts to be favorable for managers, managers benefit
but analysts place their reputation at risk. Furthermore, both of these activities are difficult to
assess in terms of magnitude, making it hard for either player to gauge how much more
reciprocity they can extract from the other player if they choose to coordinate. Analysts don’t
know how accessible managers are being relative to the amount of information they have at their
disposal. Managers, on the other hand, don’t know how much the analysts are willing to adjust
their forecasts and how rigorously they will hold managers to the forecasts.
Beyond having the ability for both players to provide meaningful assurances to the other,
managers and analysts are likely to be playing an assurance game because both a risk-dominant
strategy and a payoff-dominant strategy exist. Work on social dilemmas has found that
coordinated cooperation can emerge as a dominant strategy and second equilibrium to the
traditional “mutual defection” equilibrium of a Prisoner’s dilemma game when there is a chance
for repeated interaction, ability for players to communicate, and available information on the
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other player’s past behavior (Axelrod, 2006 [1984]). With well-known quarterly interactions;
frequent, regulated and even institutional communication through investor relations departments
(Rao & Sivakumar, 1999); earnings calls (Frankel et al., 2010); other more informal visits and
interactions (Hershberg, 2012); and publicly available information on both managers and
analysts past behavior, managers and analysts meet the criteria that increases their potential to
coordinate their behavior. Again, under conditions where an alternate equilibrium exists,
assurance games should be considered as more accurate models of the interaction (Kollock,
1998).

4.3.3 The relative value of managerial payoffs. The pattern of the payoffs defines the strategic
interaction among the interacting parties (Parkhe, 1993). Figure 2 depicts managers’ decision
tree and resulting payoffs. Figure 3 provides a more detailed look at managers’ payoff matrix
when engaged in an assurance game with analysts. This figure describes the potential
managerial payoffs, highlighting both the interdependence of managers and analysts and the
multiple forms that can characterize their interface. Again, assurance games are characterized by
the order of their relative payoffs. Within each of the four possible sets of payoffs, I will argue
that there is a relative order of payoff magnitude for managers similar to payoffs in an assurance
game.

Mutual Coordination (Q1). When both managers and analysts decide to coordinate their
behaviors they have chosen their payoff-dominant strategy. Both parties are assured that the
other will coordinate their behavior so both take the risk of bonding with the other. In this case,
managers are accessible to analysts, providing analysts with the opportunity to gather unique
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information. Analysts issue favorable forecasts allowing managers to engage in self-interested
behavior.

Analyst Dominant (Q2). When analysts defect, choosing their risk-dominant strategy, but
managers attempt to bond, choosing their payoff-dominant strategy, analysts will benefit from
this inconsistency and managers will suffer in the short-term, making this state unsustainable
because of the imbalance in payoffs. In this case, managers are accessible to analysts but
analysts continue to be strict monitors, offering unfavorable forecasts. This is the worst outcome
for managers because analysts now have access to private information and are exposing any
evidence of non-value-added managerial behavior through pessimistic forecasts or evidence of
potential value-added activity through overly optimistic forecasts.
In line with assurance game-theoretic reasoning that finds asymmetric strategies
unsustainable (Agarwal et al., 2010; Kollock, 1998), when managers act favorably toward
analysts and analysts do not similarly reciprocate favorably managers are likely to subsequently
react negatively (Westphal & Clement, 2008). This suggests that, when managers are
moderately accessible and analysts do not reciprocate with favorable forecasts, managers are
subsequently likely to restrict access for analysts.

Manager Dominant (Q3). Alternatively, when managers defect, choosing their risk-dominant
strategy, but analysts choose their payoff-dominant strategy, managers benefit from the
asymmetric strategies. In this case, analysts issue optimistic forecasts but management provides
inadequate internal access. Managers benefit from this forecast favorability because they are
able to engage in slightly more self-interested behavior than they could when analysts issue
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unfavorable forecasts. However, managers still cannot maximize their self-interested behavior
because, just as in the analyst dominant situation, the asymmetry is unsustainable, suggesting
analyst forecast favorability will be fleeting when managers do not reciprocate. Furthermore,
analysts are able to make quick adjustments to their forecasts by issuing revised forecasts, which
contributes to the transient nature of a manager dominant payoff.

Mutual Defection (Q4). When both managers and analysts defect, they have both chosen their
risk-dominant strategy. Both parties do not believe the other is willing to coordinate their
behavior so they are not willing to take the risk of bonding with the other. In this case, managers
are not accessible to analysts because they have no expectation that analysts will reciprocate with
optimistic forecasts. Since accessibility without the potential for more lenient forecasts will only
invite unwanted scrutiny on their decisions, managers choose to be minimally accessible.
Accordingly, analysts, with little expectation of meaningful internal access, monitor managers
closely, scrutinizing managerial behavior using all public information available. Managers can
exercise some self-interested behavior by limiting internal accessibility but, absent external
validation, there are limits to their ability to act self-interestedly without challenge.

These four payoff outcomes suggest that the value of self-interested behavior to managers
is highest when both coordinate and lowest when there is asymmetry, such that managers
cooperate by being accessible to analysts while analysts defect by issuing unfavorable forecasts.
However, when the asymmetry is reversed with managers limiting access and analysts issuing
optimistic forecasts, managerial self-interested behavior is relatively high, second only to the
state of mutual coordination. When both players choose not to coordinate, the value of self-
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interested behavior to managers is modest although not as low as when managers expend
goodwill to bond without reciprocation from analysts. Formally, these arguments suggest the
following inequalities:

MAO > MIO > MIP > MAP

where M = Managerial self-interested behavior
A(I) = (In-) Accessibility
O(P) = Optimistic (Pessimistic) analyst forecasts

4.3.4 The implications of assurance games between managers and analysts. These inequalities
have empirical implications. As argued earlier and validated through game-theoretic reasoning
as well, when analyst forecasts are more optimistic managers can be more self-interested (MO >
MP) regardless of how accessible managers choose to be. However, when considering the
impact of accessibility on managerial payoffs, this basic relationship changes.
Schelling (2011) theorized that coordination games have highly polarizing effects
because there is no stable focal point except at the extremes – complete coordination or
contention. Thus, players quickly move to either of the two equilibria and either “over”coordinate (i.e., collude) or completely neglect one another. Consistent with this effect, manager
payoffs likely polarize when manager and analyst efforts to coordinate are considered
simultaneously. When managers are accessible to analysts, in the absence of favorable analyst
forecasts they suffer because not only can they not act self-interestedly without being scrutinized
but they have also given analysts access to private information that can assist analysts in their
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scrutiny or target setting. Thus, when forecasts are pessimistic and managers are accessible,
managerial self-interested behavior should decline more steeply.
Schelling’s observations also suggests that assurances between managers and analysts
create a context where managers are less likely to view overly optimistic forecasts as placing
constraints on their behavior. Recall that I argued, on average, managers define the favorability
of forecasts in the context of analysts as monitors, constraining managerial behavior. As
monitors, analysts strictly relay the information they have in their forecasts. When analysts issue
pessimistic forecasts, they call into question managerial decision-making and draw negative
investor attention to managerial behavior. When analysts issue highly optimistic forecasts they
believe the firm has potential. This optimism sends positive signals to investors deflecting their
scrutiny, but from the manager’s perspective analysts are effectively setting very rigorous targets
that constrain managerial self-interested behavior because if managers miss these targets they
could attract negative investor attention (Graham et al., 2005). However, if analysts “overcoordinate” with managers, relaxing their role as strict monitors then this changes how managers
view these overly optimistic forecasts. Under conditions of mutual coordination, managers have
assurances that analysts will make very modest revisions to these optimistic forecasts if
necessary throughout the year without drawing investor attention because analysts want to
maintain internal access. Amir and Ganzach (1998) find evidence for this type of leniency in
analysts’ forecasts. These authors argued that analyst leniency is revealed through optimistic
forecasts and their moderation in negative short-run forecast revisions. This suggests that
analysts can be optimistic at the start of the year but still achieve their own goals of year-end
accuracy by making modest, non-attention drawing forecast revisions throughout the year.
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Overall, analyst leniency calls for a more linear relationship between forecast optimism and selfinterested behavior when analyst forecasts are optimistic.
By simultaneously considering manager and analyst decisions, game-theoretic reasoning
changes the relationship between analyst forecast optimism and managerial self-interested
behavior. First, when managers are accessible the relationship between optimism and selfinterested behavior should be stronger than when managers are inaccessible because accessibility
provides assurances to analysts who should reciprocate with more optimistic forecasts, allowing
more self-interested behavior. Second, the shape of the non-linear relationship between
optimism and self-interested behavior should be more linear when managers are accessible
because, when managers and analysts are cooperating, managers no longer view overlyoptimistic forecasts unfavorably. These arguments suggest the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5a: Managerial accessibility strengthens the relationship between analyst
forecast optimism and managerial self-interested behavior.
Hypothesis 5b: Managerial accessibility changes the quadratic relationship between
analyst forecast optimism and managerial self-interested behavior such
that when managers are accessible the relationship between analysts
forecast optimism and managerial self-interested behavior is more linear.
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CHAPTER 5: METHODS

5.1 Setting
5.1.1 Industry setting. I use a controlled industry setting to isolate a discrete proxy for
managerial self-interested behavior, which can vary widely across industries owing to
differences in industry characteristics and is difficult to observe within many industries. Similar
to past work, isolating a variable of interest in an industry where it is observable can provide
critical insight into a commonly theorized, but difficult to measure, construct (e.g., Souder &
Shaver, 2010). Furthermore, I identify an established industry to control for the effects that
industry emergence has on analysts’ treatment of firms within an industry. I am interested in
firm-level phenomena and analysts only treat firms within an industry uniquely in their forecasts
and recommendations once the industry has matured and been legitimated (Navis & Glynn,
2010). Thus, I need to identify a non-emergent industry where managerial self-interested
behavior is observable.
The theory I develop hinges on the visibility of managerial self-interested behavior to
investors. Analysts direct the attention of investors, choosing to draw attention to managerial
self-interested behavior (defecting from managers) or not (cooperating with managers). Thus,
this theory requires a measure of managerial self-interested behavior that is not obvious to the
average investor and owner but could be identified by an industry expert such as a securities
analyst. This is critical because it underscores the industry expertise that analysts provide the
capital market and distinguishes analysts from retail investors. If the public could easily identify
and assess managerial self-interested behavior then securities analysts would struggle to stay
relevant. Furthermore, imperceptibility of this activity is important to allow managers discretion
in expressing self-interested behavior. Graham and colleagues (2005) found that managers view
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real investments, such as spending on R&D, as not only more visible actions, but better
understood by their public audience than accounting actions, such as reserve behavior. Thus,
accounting measures are more likely to satisfy my criteria.
Cash holdings (O'Brien & Folta, 2009) and aggregate accruals (McNichols, 2000) have
been used as measures with managerial discretion because managers can use cash and accruals
for discretionary purposes. Cash measures do send external signals that invite visibility (O'Brien
& Folta, 2009) and aggregate accruals obscure managerial behavior in a composite measure
(McNichols, 2000). However, specific accruals, such as insurance reserves, are stronger
indicators of managerial behavior (McNichols, 2000) and receive less external attention (Gaver
& Paterson, 2004). Reserve decisions fall in the domain of accounting activity (Gaver &
Paterson, 2004) rather than “real” business activity and, as a result, retail investors find
accounting activity less accessible (Graham et al., 2005), allowing both managers and analysts to
exercise discretion. Consistent with these arguments, insurance reserves are used as a proxy for
managerial discretion in the accounting literature (e.g. Beaver et al., 2003; Petroni, 1992).
Not only is the level of reserves at the discretion of managers, but they are also an
indicator of managerial self-interested behavior. Because of the accounting standards governing
the insurance industry, insurance companies will hold money in reserves to fulfill future benefit
and claim obligations. Managers can exercise significant discretion in the amount of reserves
they hold because of the uncertainty surrounding the actual claim and benefit obligations
(Nissim, 2010). Holding additional reserves is a risk-averse way for managers to protect against
this uncertain future liability and insulate themselves from future scrutiny (Stein, 1989).
Furthermore, excess reserves ultimately not used for these risk averse purposes can provide
managers with slack to pursue their own choice projects (Jensen, 1986; O'Brien, 2003),
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motivated by their interests in building a legacy (Matta & Beamish, 2008) or an empire
(Baldenius et al., 2014).
Specific to risk, reserve levels represent a discrete measure of risk in managerial
behavior. Firm risk in the context of managerial agency arguments has been measured in a
variety of ways including proxies derived from stock returns, financial ratios and income stream
uncertainty (for review see Miller & Bromiley, 1990). Specifically, common measures of risk
include book-to-equity (e.g. Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 2011), beta (for review see Ruefli,
Collins, & Lacugna, 1999), expenditures on R&D, capital and long-term debt (Devers et al.,
2008). These are composite measures that indicate top managers’ overall risk tolerance, but they
say nothing about the level of risk in specific decisions that managers make. Managers have the
ability to configure their decisions, perhaps choosing to exercise risk along visible measures of
risk and maintain risk aversion along less well-understood activities. This suggests that
managers may demonstrate risk along visible measures, but exercise risk aversion in less visible
measures, again, calling for a discrete measure of self-interested risk and indicating that visible
measures could be insufficient in capturing managerial self-interested behavior.
Using a measure of reserves, I limit my sample to the insurance industry because it is a
non-emergent industry and it isolates a discrete measure of managerial self-interested behavior.

5.1.2 Time period setting. I position the study from 2001 to 2012 after significant discontinuous
change in the regulatory environment. Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD), which
fundamentally changed the rules related to private disclosure, came into full practice in 2001.
RegFD requires all publicly traded companies to make all disclosures public. This regulation
eliminated the practice of selective disclosure where firms provided certain investors and

53

analysts with private firm-specific information. The implementation of RegFD increased
information asymmetry between the managers and analysts (Straser, 2002), significantly limiting
private disclosures and hindering analysts’ individual and consensus accuracy (Agrawal et al.,
2006). The increased relevance of public disclosures to analysts (Charoenrook & Lewis, 2009;
Irani, 2004) after RegFD and the decreased impact that private disclosure channels had on
analyst forecasts immediately following RegFD (Cohen et al., 2010) indicate that RegFD created
significant discontinuous change in the practice of private disclosure. Thus, a study crossing this
regulatory overhaul would likely obscure effects related to analyst’s access to private
information.
While RegFD has limited overt selective disclosure of private information, it has not shut
down private information channels altogether. Indeed, those analysts who have risen to the top
of their field post-RegFD “rely on industry contacts and good channel checks… Analysts can
spend upward of 100 days on the road each year, attending industry conferences, meeting
investors and visiting their companies' plants, outlets and headquarters. The trends they spot, the
problems they see, the vibes they get when talking with management are often the difference [in
their performance]” (Hershberg, 2012). Thus, RegFD has not stopped analysts from seeking
private information but it has made the exchange more passive. Managers no longer can
selectively share private information but they can provide analysts access to management and
internal operations through in-person meetings. These meetings likely took place before RegFD
but were not disclosed; after RegFD these meeting are disclosed and now measurable. Thus,
focusing on the time period after 2001 keeps the type of private “disclosure” consistent and
observable.
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5.2 Data
I created an unbalanced panel data set using public companies identified in
COMPUSTAT in the insurance industry (SIC 63) from 2001-2012. I removed insurers with
more than 80% of their reserves dedicated to reinsurance because this is an indicator that their
core business is dedicated to reinsurance. Reinsurers are guided by special accounting rules
because their exposure or risk can vary significantly based on the type of reinsurance contract
(Nissim, 2010). Since I cannot isolate the different contracts and accounting practices to parse
their effects, I have chosen to remove these reinsurers from the sample.
Furthermore, I dropped 4 outlying observations assessing their Cook’s Distance at the
critical value of the F distribution F(35, 799)=0.98 at α=.50 (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken,
2003). Finally, removing observations with missing variables, my final sample includes 828
firm-year observations across 107 unique firms. Variable descriptive statistics and correlations
are in Table 1.

5.3 Measurement
5.3.1 Managerial self-interested behavior. Sourced from COMPUSTAT, I collected data on
reserves, reported on insurers’ balance sheets as a liability. While past authors have scaled
reserves by total assets in a year t (e.g., Beaver et al., 2003), I scale this figure by total premiums.
I make this choice to remove the effects of non-insurance business within these insurers,
particularly for health insurers. Since health insurers have a mix of risk (membership where the
insurance company takes the risk and collects premiums) and non-risk (membership where the
customer takes the risk and the insurance company collects fees for providing the administration)
business, total assets are not reflective of the actual size of the insured risk. Thus, I scale the
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reserves by premiums to get reserve per dollar of premium. Finally, I take the natural log of this
number because a skewness-kurtosis normality test indicated kurtosis (p < .01) and skewness (p
< .01), which significantly rejected the null hypothesis that reserves per dollar of premium is
normally distributed. Formally, I calculated this measure as:
SIB t = log (RESERVESt / PREMIUMSt)

5.3.2 Accessibility variables. To proxy for how accessible managers are to analysts, I develop an
intensity measure using meetings that managers can choose to hold with investment banks and
brokerages. These meetings provide analysts with internal access to operations and the
opportunity to informally interact with management. This access gives analysts the opportunity
to informally gather private information through observation, management tone, etc. RegFD
requires disclosure of these meetings through a Section7 8k filing. Drawing from filings in
ThompsonOne, I collected all 8k section 7 filings for the insurance industry within the study time
period. To capture accessibility as an intensity measure, I scale the number of filings by the
number of analysts covering the firm. Specifically, I divide the total number of filings in one
year by the number of first reported analyst estimates for that year, using the count of estimates
as a proxy for analyst coverage. Formally this is calculated as:
ACCESSt = FILINGSt / ESTIMATESt
For use when interacting with a quadratic term on analyst forecast optimism I mean
centered ACCESSt by fiscal year to capture whether managers were more or less accessible in a
fiscal year compared to the rest of the insurance industry (ACCESSct). Then I created a dummy
variable (ACCESScdt) for use in the models with quadratic interactions. Scores on ACCESSct
greater than 0 were coded as a “1” and represent above mean access.
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5.3.3 Analyst forecast optimism. I develop a measure for analyst forecast optimism that is a
modified version of analyst forecast bias, more commonly drawn on in the finance and
accounting literature. Prior authors have calculated forecast optimism or pessimism as the bias difference between first reported forecast on year or quarter end EPS and year or quarter end
actual EPS and in the same year (Espahbodi, Dugar, & Tehranian, 2001; Liu, Sherman, &
Zhang, 2014). The bias, if positive, assumes the difference represents optimism rather than
error. Scholars using this distal measure of forecast bias end up controlling for several
extraordinary items to isolate the bias. Controlling for the volatility of returns over the course of
the measurement year attempts to control for error found in measures of bias because the
earnings on more volatile firms are harder to forecast accurately (Lim, 2001). Further, using
consensus forecasts, specifically the median forecast across all covering analysts, serves as a
natural control on inaccuracy related to lack of ability.
Despite the ability for this common measure of forecast bias to isolate forecast optimism,
reserves, the dependent variable, can be used to manipulate earnings throughout the year (Beaver
et al., 2003). Scholars using the distal measure of forecast bias often control for the confounding
risk of managerial earnings manipulation that can happen between the initial forecast and the
reporting of year end results (Lim, 2001). However, this is precisely the variable of interest in
this study. To further explain, I consider the effects of this distal forecast measure with respect
to my study. Consider when analysts’ first forecasts come in close to year-end actual results,
analyst bias is close to zero. Analysts could have accurately predicted a relatively stale year and
that is what happened – they were neither overly optimistic nor pessimistic. In this case forecast
bias accurately captures their outlook at the start of the year. However, this neutral bias could
also have resulted because managers decided to draw down reserves to boost up earnings to meet
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overly optimistic analyst forecasts. In this case I would not capture this optimistic outlook using
the distal measure of bias.
Thus, to reduce the confounded relationship between reserves and optimism throughout a
forecast period, I use a modified calculation of forecast bias. Similar to more recent work (Kato,
Skinner, & Kunimura, 2009), I capture the degree of analyst forecast bias as the difference
between median analysts’ forecasts on EPS at the start of year t and the actual year-end EPS at
year t-1. This measure also makes strides at reducing the presence of forecast error in the
calculation of forecast optimism. First, I use the median forecast across all covering analysts,
naturally reducing error. Second, there is not a significant intervening time period to create the
opportunity for volatility error between the prior year-end result and the first reported forecast
for the following year.
I label this more proximal measure of forecast bias, forecast optimism to more closely
reflect my theory. Since I argue that self-interested behavior changes at high levels of forecast
optimism (when bias is positive), it is the optimistic end of forecast bias that is of primary
interest in this study. Furthermore, there is evidence that analysts tend to be more optimistic than
pessimistic (De Bondt & Thaler, 1990). My data reflects this optimistic tendency as well with a
0.01 mean score on optimism, a maximum of 1.80 and a minimum of -0.30.
Finally, consistent with measures of forecasts on EPS I scale the difference between
analysts’ median year end forecast and the prior year’s actual year-end result by stock price to
allow for comparability (Amir & Ganzach, 1998; Lim, 2001). Using this measure I am capturing
analysts’ outlook for the upcoming year - whether or not they think a firm will perform better
this year over last year. Specifically, I calculate analysts’ optimism as:
OPTIMISMt = FEPSfirst,t – AEPSfinal,t-1,/ SPfinal,t-1

58

Where AEPSfinal,t-1 is the actual EPS at the firm’s annual fiscal close in fiscal year t-1, and
FEPSfirst,t is the first reported median annual EPS forecast for the fiscal year t. The difference
between FEPSfirst,t and AEPSfinal,t-1 is expressed as a percentage of the stock price at the end of
year t-1 (SPfinal, t-1). OPTIMISMt indicates the optimism in analysts’ initial median forecast in
year t. Negative numbers indicate pessimism and scores close to zero reflect impartiality.

5.3.4 Firm performance. I will measure firm performance with return on equity (ROEt) sourced
from COMPUSTAT. In theorizing the effects of firm performance, I argued that managers and
analysts are more likely to pursue their own self-interests when investor-owner interests are
being adequately met. ROE is a measure of the return on investor equity, therefore it is a good
proxy for investor firm performance goals. In this sample mean ROE is 9%.

5.3.5 Control Variables. I plan to control for the expected duration of the exchange between
analysts and managers because longer-horizon exchanges create more motivation for reciprocity
to facilitate the exchange (Das & Teng, 2002). To proxy this expected exchange horizon, I will
use the CEO’s age, as younger CEO’s have a longer career horizon (Matta & Beamish, 2008)
and subsequently a longer expected horizon to engage in social exchange with analysts. Thus, I
expect CEO age (AGEt) to be negatively related future management accessibility. In addition,
older CEOs are more likely to have higher quality financial reporting (Huang, Rose-Green, &
Lee, 2012), suggesting that older CEOs are less likely to manipulate reserves to their benefit.
Thus I expect CEO age to be negatively related to managerial self-interested behavior. I sourced
CEO age from Compustat’s Execucomp database and filled in missing values through manual
look-ups on ThompsonOne. The average age of CEOs in my dataset is 56.
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In the model of managerial self-interested behavior, I also control for the firms’ end of
year cash position at t-1. Excess cash in the prior year provides more opportunity to increase
subsequent year reserves, suggesting that cash and reserves are likely to be positively related. I
divide the firm’s cash by total assets at t-l to scale for firm size (CASHt-1). In addition, while I
use median analysts’ forecasts to calculate analysts’ forecast optimism, I recognize consensus
around that median forecast will vary. I control for the standard deviation of first reported
analyst forecasts (FORSDt) in both models to isolate the effect of optimism in analysts’
forecasts on both manager’s self-interested behavior and their accessibility.
To control for year effects, I include year dummy variables for the years represented in
the sample. This sample crosses over years that likely have significant impact on managerial
decision making, such as the Great Recession. Furthermore, when RegFD initially passed there
is evidence that in the years immediately following the passage, analysts and managers had less
interaction (Cohen et al., 2010), but I expect they adapted over time. Dummy variables on year
should control for this effect in the early years following RegFD and the years during the Great
Recession.
Finally, in the managerial accessibility model, I also control for sector effects. In this
model I do not use a fixed effects specification and the number of firms makes controlling for
firm effects inefficient. The various sectors of the insurance industry tend to have slightly
different approaches to reserve decisions because of the nature of the insured risk (Nissim,
2010). Thus, I created a sector dummies for the various sectors of the insurance industry to
control for these effects on managerial accessibility.

60

5.4 Model Specification
5.4.1 Managerial self-interested behavior model. To test the hypotheses where managerial selfinterested behavior is the dependent variable I use a two-way firm-year fixed effects panel
regression model. Using this approach, I can model within firm changes, controlling for
differences between firms (such as actuarial and underwriting aptitude). A Hausman test rejects
the null hypothesis that fixed effect and random effect coefficients are the same (χ2 = 79.13,
p<.01), providing support for the fixed-effect specification. The full model specification is

expressed as:

SIBit = βOPTIMISMit + βOPTIMISM2it + βROEit + βFORSDit + βAGEit + βCASHit-1
βACCESScdit + βOPTIMISMit*ACCESScdit + βOPTIMISM2it*ACCESScdit +
βOPTIMISMit*ROEit + βOPTIMISM2it*ROEit + YEARdit + εi
Where:
SIBit = Managerial self-interested behavior for the ith firm in year t
OPTIMISMit = First reported analyst forecast optimism for the ith firm in year t
OPTIMISM2it = The square of first reported analyst forecast optimism for the ith firm in year t
ROEit = Return on equity for the ith firm in year t
REGFDit = Time elapsed since RegFD for the ith firm in year t
FORSDit = Standard deviation of first reported forecasts for the ith firm in year t
AGEit = CEO age for the ith firm in year t
CASHit-1 = Cash for the ith firm in year t-1
ACCESScdit = Indicator for accessibility at or above the fiscal year mean for the ith firm in year t
YEARdit = Vector of dummy variables on year for the ith firm in year t
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5.4.2 Managerial accessibility model. To test the hypotheses where accessibility is the
dependent variable, I use a random effects Tobit panel regression model. With 222 out of 705
observations on accessibility, equal to zero, the dependent variable has a corner solution outcome
and can be estimated using a tobit regression model (Woolridge, 2002). The full model is
expressed as:

ACCESS*i,t+1 = βOPTIMISMit + βOPTIMISM2it + βSIBit + βROEit + βFORSDit + βAGEit
+ βACCESSi,t + SECTORdit + YEARdit + ui
ACCESSi,t-1

=0
if ACCESS*i,t+1 ≤ 0
*
= ACCESS i,t+1 if ACCESS*i,t+1 > 0

Where:
ACCESSi,t+1 = Accessibility for the ith firm in year t+1
ACCESSi,t = Accessibility for the ith firm in year t
OPTIMISMit = First reported analyst forecast optimism for the ith firm in year t
OPTIMISM2it = The square of first reported analyst forecast optimism for the ith firm in year t
SIBit = Managerial self-interested behavior for the ith firm in year t
ROEit = Return on equity for the ith firm in year t
FORSDit = Standard deviation of first reported forecasts for the ith firm in year t
AGEit = CEO age for the ith firm in year t
SECTORdit = Vector of industry sector dummy variables for the ith firm in year t
YEARdit = Vector of dummy variables on year for the ith firm in year t
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS

6.1 Results for Fixed Effects Regression on Managerial Self-interested Behavior
Table 2a presents results for a series of fixed effects regression models on managerial
self-interested behavior (Models 1-5). In addition to coefficient estimates on the predictor
variables, I also report model statistics. Specifically, I report the F-statistic to test if the
coefficients in the model are different than zero. I also report all R2 estimates, but will focus my
attention only R2within because that is the most useful model estimate in a fixed effect model as it
describes the amount of within firm variance explained by the model (Ashley, 2012). Finally, all
model iterations report the intraclass correlation (rho) is 0.97. This suggests that 97% of the
variance is due to firm-level differences in reserve behavior, supporting the fixed effect
specification, and lending addition importance to R2within estimates.
Model 1 is the base model with only control variables. The F-statistic suggests
acceptable model fit (F=2.18, p<.05) and the model explains 8.1% of within firm variance
(R2within = 0.0812). Model 2 adds analyst forecast optimism weakening model fit (F=1.85,
p<.05), but helping explain more within firm variance (R2within = 0.0915). Model 3 adds the
direct effect of the variables that are hypothesized to interact with optimism, namely accessibility
and ROE (F=2.09, p<.05) and Model 4 is the full linear model including the linear optimism
interactions with accessibility and ROE respectively. Fit improves in Model 4 (F=2.08, p<.05)
over Model 2 and explains 6% more within firm variance (R2within = 0.1532).
In Model 5 the squared-term on optimism is added, as are the accessibility and ROE
interactions with this squared term to complete the full non-linear model. Model fit improves
dramatically (F=11.83, p<.01) over all prior models with this full model explaining 22.19% of
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the within firm variance on managerial self-interested behavior. As expected the linear (β= 1.91,
p<.05) and squared (β= -1.06, p<.05) terms on analyst forecast optimism are statistically
significant and in the hypothesized direction. Since the squared term on forecast optimism can
be interpreted as an interaction of optimism with itself, I graph both the linear effect of optimism
from Model 4 and the quadratic effect of optimism in model 5 to show the true effect (Cohen et
al., 2003). Figure 4 indicates a non-linear effect of forecast optimism on managerial selfinterested behavior. As forecasts get more optimistic, managers hold onto more reserves, but
this positive effect dampens when analysts are overly optimistic and managers are forced to
manage toward higher targets. This result is consistent with hypothesis 1.
I also use Model 5 to test hypothesis 2. First, the direct effect of ROE on self-interested
behavior is negative and modestly significant (β = -0.31, p<.10), suggesting that irrespective of
analysts, the better firms perform, the less managers will act self-interestedly with respect to
reserves. This could suggest that managers only act self-interestedly when pressured by poor
performance that threatens their employment stability and wealth. It is also possible that when
performance is strong, managers no longer are faced with a need to stockpile reserves to protect
against future losses because they already have additional slack to protect against these losses.
Furthermore, when performance is strong, managers are more likely to be risk neutral (Bromiley,
2010).
Examining the coefficients on the interaction between forecast optimism and ROE, the
ROE interaction with the linear term on optimism is statistically significant (β = 2.50, p<.01),
suggesting strong support for hypothesis 2. This indicates that the effect of analyst optimism on
managerial self-interested behavior is weaker for low performing firms and stronger for high
performing firms, as hypothesized. Figure 5 illustrates this relationship contrasting lower
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performing (1 standard deviation below mean ROE) and higher performing (1 standard deviation
above the mean) firms. Among lower-performing firms, increasing forecast optimism has less of
an effect on the amount of reserves managers hold because scrutinizing investors are
constraining managers’ ability to over or under-reserve. On the other hand, higher-performing
firms are not constrained by investor scrutiny and, as a result, are much more likely to
manipulate reserves as analysts’ get more optimistic.
While I did not hypothesize a change in the shape of quadratic term on optimism and
ROE, I do note that this interaction was also significant (β = -1.76, p<.05). Figure 5 shows that
low-performing firms have a more linear shape, not constraining their reserve behavior when
analysts are overly optimistic. This different shape is likely related to the prior explanation on
the linear interaction. As low-performing firms are under more investor scrutiny they not only
constrain their manipulation of reserves, but they also are much more consistent in their reserve
behavior regardless of optimism in analyst forecasts.
Finally, I test hypotheses related to the application of the assurance game to the
relationship between managers and analysts. First, in Figure 6, I evaluate my data in a simplistic
payoff matrix where I use the dummy variable I created to represent above and below mean
accessibility and I dichotomize forecast optimism between optimistic (scores > 0) and
pessimistic (scores< 0) forecasts. This allows me to examine both the distribution of my
observations in the assurance payoff matrix and the mean value of managerial self-interested
behavior (managers’ payoff) in each quadrant. As discussed, assurance games have two
equilibria, mutual coordination and mutual defection, thus I should see most observations
concentrated in these quadrants as behavior polarizes in assurance games (Schelling, 2011).
While over 51% of the observations are in these two quadrants, the single quadrant that holds the
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majority of observations have managers and analysts both choosing to defect (40% of all
observations). When managers and analysts do choose to mutually coordinate mean selfinterested behavior is 1.22, the highest across the payoff matrix. These descriptive statistics
suggest that the assurance game is a valid theoretical framing because mutual coordination does
yield the highest payoff. However, it seems managers and analysts struggle to develop
assurances to reach that equilibrium state.
Next, I use Model 5 to test hypothesis 5 where I predicted that accessibility should
strengthen the relationship between optimism and self-interested behavior (hypothesis 5a) and
make the relationship more linear (hypothesis 5b). The interaction of the linear term on
optimism and accessibility is significant but in the opposite direction than hypothesized (β = 1.68, p<.05), rejecting support for hypothesis 5a. The interaction of accessibility and the
quadratic term on optimism was also significant (β = 1.02, p<.05). Because this is an interaction
with a non-linear term, I graph these results to assist in hypothesis testing. Figure 7a shows the
effect of different levels of analyst forecast optimism on predicted managerial self-interested
behavior when accessibility is above the mean and below the mean. When managers are
accessible the shape of the curve is more linear than when managers are inaccessible, providing
support for hypothesis 5b. However, this graph clearly illustrates that contrary to hypothesis 5a,
the relationship between forecast optimism and self-interested behavior is much weaker when
managers are accessible.
Figure 7b overlays the theoretical inequalities (MAO > MIO > MIP > MAP) driven by
assurance game-theoretic reasoning (for reference refer back to Section 4.3.3) on the graph of
predicted managerial self-interested behavior. It is clear that these inequalities are not consistent
with the model results. The model suggests the following inequalities: MIO >MAO > MAP > MIP.
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Managers maximize their self-interested behavior when they are inaccessible to analysts and
analysts are optimistic (MIO) with mutual cooperation (MAO) falling to the second highest
outcome. This result is more consistent with the payoff structure of a Prisoner’s dilemma game
than an assurance game (Kollock, 1998), suggesting that managers and analysts may not have a
motivation to prefer coordination. Phenomenological evidence of contention between managers
and analysts fit these findings (e.g. Turner, 2005).
Considering both the results for firm performance and accessibility, in section 6.4.2 I
conduct a post-hoc analysis that explores a more contingent model of managerial self-interested
behavior. I argue there is evidence that it is only among low-performing firms with concerned
investors that accessibility becomes particularly important to analysts who need internal
information to develop their closely-watched forecasts and optimism becomes particularly
important to managers who need to reassure investors when times are tough. This
interdependence in tough times propels them to see value in coordination that results in
assurance game-theoretic payoffs.

6.2 Results for Censored Random Effects Regression on Managerial Accessibility
Table 2b presents the results for the censored (tobit) random effects regression on
accessibility (Models 6-10). I will draw from these results to see if there is evidence to support
hypotheses 3 and 4. Similar to the model-building approach used in the prior set of models, I
start again with a base model (Model 6) that includes just control variables. Model fit is strong
(Χ2 = 281.18, p<.05) and improves only modestly when I add forecast optimism into the equation
in Model 7 (Χ2 = 283.51, p<.05). In model 8 I add the squared term on optimism, which does not
improve model fit (Χ2 = 283.50, p<.05). I use this model to test hypothesis 3. I argued that
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managers are more likely to bond with analysts by offering access when analysts issue optimistic
forecasts and this relationship will dampen at high levels of analyst optimism. However, neither
optimism (β = -0.32, p>.10) nor the squared term on optimism (β = 0.02, p>.10) is statistically
significant, thereby rejecting support for hypothesis 3.
Using the guidelines provided in Mathieu and Taylor (2006) to test for full mediation
hypothesized in hypothesis 4, the path between forecast optimism and accessibility must be
significant as a precondition. Given that I have already not found evidence of this relationship, I
can reject support for hypothesis 4. However, even absent this relationship an indirect
relationship is still possible because, as discussed earlier, optimism and its quadratic term do
carry statistically significant relationships with self-interested behavior (from Model 5: β = 1.91,
p<.05 and β = -1.06, p<.05 respectively). Thus I turn to Model 9 to test the relationship between
self-interested behavior and accessibility. Adding self-interested behavior to base model
degrades model fit modestly (Χ2 = 280.68, p<.05) and self-interested behavior does not have a
strong relationship with access (β = 0.03, p>.10). Model 10 considers the simultaneous effect of
optimism and self-interested behavior on accessibility. Model fit improves over Model 9 (Χ2 =
283.49, p<.01). Again self-interested behavior does not demonstrate a statistically significant
relationship with accessibility (β = 0.04, p>.10). This suggests there is neither evidence of full
mediation, nor evidence of an indirect effect. Put differently there is no evidence that managers
are considering how analysts impact their ability to behave self-interestedly when managers are
making decisions on their accessibility. This calls into question the interdependence assumption
between managers and analysts that is crucial to fueling an exchange relationship between the
two.

68

It is important to note that in order to meet the causal order preconditions of mediation I
rely on temporal precedence (Mathieu, J.E. & Taylor, S.R., 2007, 2006) with optimism measured
as the first reported forecast in the year, reserves as the year-end reserves and accessibility in the
following year. Thus, there can be nearly two years between the measurement of optimism and
accessibility in this model. Ensuring this rigorous temporal precedence in addition to data
limitations could be impacting the results for hypotheses 3 and 4. I discuss these limitations in
more detail in Section 7.3.1. Furthermore, in Section 6.4.1 I conduct a post-hoc analysis that
relaxes the temporal precedence of these key variables.

6.3 Robustness Analyses
6.3.1 Expanded sample. While the focus of this study is on the period after the implementation
of Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2001, I also collected data back to 1991 to test the consistency
of the basic relationship between analyst forecast and managerial self-interested behavior.
Descriptive statistics and correlations for this larger sample can be found in Table 3a. I re-ran
the linear and quadratic fixed effect regression models for forecast optimism on managerial selfinterested behavior. Instead of year dummies, I used a single dummy for post-RegFD
observations (occurring in the time period after 2001). The results can be found in Table 3b.
The dummy variable on post-RegFD indicates that there are no statistically significant
differences in managerial self-interested behavior before and after RegFD (β = 0.05, p>.10). It is
important to note that I could not test for any relationships that involved accessibility prior to
RegFD because accessibility was unobservable, which is the rationale for placing my study in
the post-RegFD environment.
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In this robustness check, analyst forecast optimism exhibits the same curvilinear
relationship with managerial self-interested behavior across the full sample (1991 – 2012).
Optimism is positive and significant (β = 1.42, p<.05) and optimism-squared is negative and
significant (β = -0.86, p<.05). Similar to my analysis earlier, I graphed the predicted managerial
self-interested behavior across different levels of optimism in both the linear and quadratic
models. Figure 8a demonstrates a similar non-linear relationship between optimism and
managerial self-interested behavior as found in the post-RegFD sample.
Furthermore, I was able to test the interaction between forecast optimism and ROE. The
positive and significant coefficient on the interaction between ROE and the linear term on
optimism (β = 2.92, p<.01) provides additional support for the hypothesis that firm performance
strengthens the relationship between analyst forecast optimism and self-interested behavior.
Figure 8b depicts this relationship. These results also support a significant interaction between
ROE and the squared term on forecast optimism (β = -2.46, p<.01). The graph shows that the
relationship between optimism and self-interested behavior is also more linear when firms are
performing poorly. As expected, these results are similar to results found in the post-RegFD
sample.

6.3.2 Negative binomial regression on managerial accessibility. I argue that accessibility is an
intensity construct, such that managerial accessibility provides analysts a deep level of
information about management and operations. I represent the intensity of accessibility by
dividing the number of reported management interactions with analysts by the number of
analysts covering the firm to get a continuous measure. However, at its core, the number of
interactions is a non-negative count variable, suggesting a count model (Rock, Sedo, &
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Willenborg, 2001). In this data set the minimum count of RegFD filings is 0 and the maximum
is 28. Rather than predicting the intensity of managerial accessibility, creating a model using
count data would predict the probability of another manager-analyst interaction.
A negative binomial model is indicated if there is a contagion effect such that the
probability of more interactions changes once there is one interaction (Long, 1997). To account
for this possibility and test the robustness of the tobit results, I run a fixed effects negative
binomial model on the original count data of the number of RegFD filings, using the number of
analysts to impose a conditional exposure in the model. The results of this test are in Table 4 and
are similar to those from the tobit model. No statistically significant relationships are revealed.

6.4 Post-Hoc Analyses
6.4.1 Model with more proximal outcome on accessibility. I conducted a post-hoc analysis that
uses the more proximal current year accessibility in testing a relationship between analyst
optimism and managerial accessibility. As argued earlier the significant time lag between
forecast optimism at the start of year t and accessibility at the end of year t+1 could be
contributing to the non-significant relationship between the two. I create this time lag to
maintain temporal precedence in testing the hypothesized mediation of self-interested behavior.
However, for this post-hoc analysis I simply test the direct effect of analyst forecast optimism at
the start of year t on accessibility by the end of year t, leaving out self-interested behavior
because I am not able to include a measure of self-interested behavior that maintains temporal
precedence in this shortened time period. Table 5 shows the result of this modified analysis.
Optimism has a negative linear relationship with accessibility (β = -2.39, p<.01), and a positive
quadratic relationship (β = 2.16, p<.01). Figure 9 graphs the relationship between forecast
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optimism and self-interested behavior from the linear model (Model 2) and the final quadratic
model to illustrate the curvilinear relationship suggested in the results. Interestingly,
accessibility decreases as forecast optimism increases. This suggests managers are more open to
meeting with analysts when analysts are pessimistic. The significant negative relationship
between ROE and accessibility (β = -0.32, p<.05) also suggests that managers feel they need
analysts the most times are tough, leading me to conduct another post-hoc analysis that may shed
more light the interaction between managers and analysts.

6.4.2 Three-way interaction between optimism, accessibility and firm performance. I argue
that when investor attention is drawn to managerial behavior – by low performance and
pessimistic analyst forecasts – managers curb their self-interested behavior. Consistent with my
arguments, my results show that performance strengthens the relationship between forecast
optimism and managerial self-interested behavior. However, I also argue that accessibility
should strengthen the relationship between forecast optimism and self-interested behavior
because it is fostering a cooperative relationship between managers and analysts. Inconsistent
with these arguments, but demonstrating strong statistical significance, I find that accessibility
actually weakens the relationship between analyst forecast optimism and self-interested
behavior. Furthermore, results of the prior post-hoc analysis suggest managers only grant access
when they are under pressure, e.g., when analysts are being pessimistic or firm performance is
weak. Together these results suggest a more complex relationship between analysts, managers
and firm performance.
When performance is high analysts will have very little cooperative bargaining power.
Evidence from the analyst literature suggests that analysts tend to drop coverage on weakly
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performing firms (McNichols & O'Brien, 1997), looking to attract new customers and retain
current customers by covering strong performing stocks (Irvine, 2004). This suggests analysts
have little leverage over high performing managers. Thus, managers of high-performing firms
dominate the relationship with analysts, limiting access to minimize any transparency and
maximize their self-interested behavior, knowing that analysts will continue their coverage, even
confident that the analyst coverage will remain optimistic to pad analyst portfolios. When
performance is strong managers can realize their highest payoffs by not coordinating with
analysts (limiting access) even when analysts are trying to coordinate with them (issuing
optimistic forecasts).
The tendency of analysts to drop coverage on lower performing firms also suggests that
when firms are performing poorly, analysts hold more equivalent power with respect to
managers because analysts can threaten to drop coverage. Furthermore, when firms are
underperforming investors rely more heavily on analyst forecasts to inform their investment
strategy and place more pressure on managers to improve performance. Under these conditions
accessibility is particularly important to analysts to gather information and optimism is
particularly important to managers to placate investors. Thus, the interdependence of managers
and analysts is strongest when performance is low, and the value of their payoffs is highest when
they coordinate.
These observations suggest that (1) among high performing firms self-interested behavior
is maximized when analysts are increasingly optimistic and accessibility is low (prisoner’s
dilemma game), but (2) among low performing firms self-interested behavior is maximized when
analysts are optimistic and accessibility is high (assurance game). I develop a dummy variable
for above mean ROE (Mean = .57, Standard Deviation = 0.50) to simplistically sort observations
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into payoff matrices under conditions of high and low performance. In figure 10a, when firm
performance is high, managers maximize their payoff by restricting accessibility when analysts
are optimistic, consistent with the prisoner’s dilemma (Q3 mean = 0.73). Managers don’t need
to coordinate with analysts to maximize their payoffs when performance is high. However,
figure 10a reveals that when performance is low, managers maximize their self-interested
behavior when managers and analysts are coordinating, consistent with assurance game theoretic
reasoning (Q1 mean = 1.79). Managers and analysts are more likely to need each other in the
face of unhappy investors. In fact, it is in this state that managers are most risk averse.
This complex relationship between firm performance, analysts forecast optimism and
accessibility also suggests the presence of a three-way interaction. Table 6 shows the results for
this new model. I use a continuous measure of forecast optimism and dichotomous measures of
ROE and accessibility to facilitate interpretation of this three-way interaction. I find there is a
significant three way interaction (β = -4.15, p<.05). Figure 11 provides clear evidence for the
assertion that managers in strong performing firms maximize their self-interested behavior when
analyst forecasts are optimistic (validating managerial behavior) and managers, with the relative
market power they hold when their firm is performing well, limit accessibility to reduce scrutiny
on their self-interested actions. The results for managers in low performing firms are less clear
in this graph, suggesting it is the combination of high performance, low accessibility and analyst
optimism that is driving the significant three-way interaction. One interpretation is that
managers and analysts operate according to assurance game – they engage in an exchange
relationship where forecast optimism and access are interdependent because they are meaningful
to the other party – except when a firm is performing really well. In this case managers will act
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self-interestedly by defecting because analysts are less relevant to individual outcomes under
these circumstances.
Game theory holds that these asymmetrical relationships (when one player defects and
the other coordinates) are not sustainable over any length of time. Specifically, it is likely that
even optimistic analysts should start to publicly challenge managers of high performing firms
that are inaccessible in order to get managers to start opening up internal access. What this graph
does not show and what this study does not address is the stability of these symmetrical or
asymmetrical relationships. This analysis requires more frequent observations along these
measures and is an important direction for future research that I address later.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

7.1 Summary of Key Findings
Past research has largely held analysts as powerful institutions monitoring managerial
behavior with managers particularly vulnerable when analysts are pessimistic. I relax these
assumptions, letting managers and analysts engage in an exchange relationship centered on their
own self-interests. In particular, this research sheds additional light onto the relationship
between managers and analysts with three key findings. First, while most prior management
research has concentrated on the effects of pessimism among analysts on managerial behaviors, I
find interesting non-linear effects at the optimistic end of forecasts. Specifically, while managers
prefer optimistic forecasts, they have diminishing returns to managers. Given that analysts tend
to be optimistic (De Bondt & Thaler, 1990), it is this end that likely has broader impact on
management practice.
Second, consistent with prior literature, I find that analysts do serve as valid institutional
monitors, directing the attention of investors. However, unlike past work I also find analyst selfinterested behavior impacts their role as monitors, fostering a self-interested exchange
relationship between managers and analysts. If analysts were consistently strict monitors,
managers should not be holding onto higher levels of reserves as a function of analyst optimism,
this should be an insignificant relationship. But I found a strong positive relationship between
forecast optimism and reserve levels. Analysts are not reflecting this risk averse, potentially
value destroying behavior in their forecasts. This can be explained by a self-interested exchange
relationship between managers and analysts. Analysts are less likely to draw attention to
managerial self-interested behavior, when managers are giving analysts something they want. In

76

particular, analysts want internal access to firm management and operations to demonstrate
validity to their investor clients. Managerial self-interests do not experience diminishing returns
to analyst optimism when managers are accessible because of the assurances that managers and
analysts have developed in their exchange relationship.
I also expected managers to act increasingly self-interestedly, when accessible managers
coordinate with optimistic analysts. However, this effect appears to be more limited to
conditions of low performance, leading to the third major finding. Firm performance is a game
changer in the exchange relationship between managers and analysts. When firms perform well,
it is managers, not analysts, who hold the power in the relationship because investor scrutiny is
less likely and analysts have self-serving incentives to cover strong performing stocks. Under
these conditions when managers restrict their accessibility they can hold excessive reserves.
However, when firms are performing poorly managers and analysts have incentive to coordinate,
working together to overcome investor anxiety. In this context managers need analysts to
condone their self-interested behavior so they are they are able to accumulate reserves to protect
against adverse events that could threaten firm survival during periods of already poor
performance. Meanwhile analysts need managers to turn performance around to become more
appealing to investors. Being optimistic on a low performing stock is risky, but can payoff for
analysts in terms of credibility if they are right. This is an interesting result because it is
precisely in these bad times that investors are looking to analysts for guidance on whether or not
to keep their investment. If analysts are condoning self-interested behavior among managers in
these times, investors are not getting the information they desire from analysts.
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7.2 Discussion of Empirical Results
While the current management literature assumes a relatively deferential role for
managers as they interact with analysts, agency bonding and game-theoretic reasoning introduce
bonding and reciprocity motivations for an exchange relationship between managers and
analysts. First, when analysts serve as monitors over managerial self-interested behavior, I find
support that analyst forecast optimism exhibits a positive relationship with managerial selfinterested behavior as more pessimistic forecasts draw investor attention and limit managerial
self-interested behavior. Furthermore, this positive relationship tapers off at high levels of
forecast optimism because these overly optimistic forecasts set challenging performance goals
for managers, forcing them to temper their self-interested behavior.
Bonding arguments in agency theory suggest that agent managers are likely to bond with
monitoring analysts in ways that analysts value, particularly when analysts are issuing forecasts
that managers view favorably. Analysts place significant value on internal access to managers
and firm operations (Hershberg, 2012). In this study I do not find support for a direct relationship
between analysts forecast optimism and managerial accessibility as I expected. However, when I
shortened the temporal distance between the time analysts issued their forecasts and when
internal meetings were held in a post hoc analysis, I found support for a direct positive
relationship between analyst forecast optimism and managerial accessibility. This result
provides support for my bonding hypothesis, but also suggests that managers have a short
memory with respect to analysts. Any benefits analysts may hope to gain from being optimistic
are fleeting.
Addressing a call for a better understanding of the actual self-interested behaviors and
events that result from opportunistic behavior interdependencies among stakeholder groups (von
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Werder, 2011), I draw on game-theoretic reasoning to inform agency bonding arguments in the
context of managers and analysts. Using game-theoretic reasoning, I argued that managers only
reciprocate for analyst optimism with accessibility when managers realize a benefit to their selfinterested behavior. I was not able to find support for the role of self-interested behavior
mediating the relationship between forecast optimism and accessibility. I identify three possible
explanations. First, this could be a result of the strict temporal precedence I imposed to ensure
methodological accuracy, which I could not resolve even in post-hoc analyses, as I could not find
an interim measure of self-interested behavior. Second, this result could suggest that players are
being cooperative to start, but making changes in subsequent iterations after evaluating their
actual payoffs. This is similar to an iterated Prisoner’s dilemma game, specifically tit-for-tat,
where players start by cooperating, will defect given cause, but don’t hold a grudge, so they will
quickly go back to cooperating (Axelrod, 2006 [1984]). In this type of game there is more
cooperation for the sake of cooperation (i.e. optimism and accessibility will be related), but
behavior is less related to actual payoffs as players are forgiving for payoff shortfalls (i.e. actual
realized self-interested behavior does not play as much of a role in the choice to cooperate).
Third, it also possible that managers are just not making attributions about changes to their selfinterested behavior to analysts. Evaluating outcome interdependence is complex, the choice to
reciprocate involves a laborious, decision process (Camerer, 1991). Boundedly rational
individuals engaged in a complex decision process have limits in their cognitive ability (Simon,
1997 [1947]; Williamson, 1985) and they simply may not take the time to evaluate whether or
not analyst optimism is impacting their behavior, but respond positively to the optimism by
being more accessible.
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Finally, I argued that managers and analysts are playing an assurance game, such that
managers’ highest payoff comes when they coordinate with analysts – providing internal access
to analysts when analysts issue optimistic forecasts. However, despite descriptive statistics
supporting this payoff intuition, I found that manager’s achieve their highest payoffs when they
restrict accessibility at times when analysts are optimistic. This type of payoff structure is more
consistent with a Prisoner’s dilemma game not an assurance game (Kollock, 1998). Trust is a
key assumption in an assurance game (Kimbrough, 2005) and these finding suggest that
managers and analysts do not exhibit a great deal of mutual trust. However, these results do
provide support for theoretical interdependence between managers and analysts. Managers need
analysts to be optimistic so managers can act self-interestedly.

7.3 Theoretical Extensions
Despite mixed results, this study extends current theory at the manager-analyst interface
by shifting the role that analysts play in strategic management theory from a powerful
institutional monitor to a similarly self-interested participant. Managers and analysts are actively
engaged in a dynamic relationship centered on their different, but interdependent self-interests.
Motivated by game-theoretic reasoning this study models variation in the interaction between
managers and analysts and defines the relative order of payoffs managers and analysts
experience across the different configurations of their interaction.
Though this dissertation is focused at the manager-analyst interface, this work makes
several broader theoretical extensions. First, by using game-theoretic reasoning to constrain
agency-bonding arguments, I demonstrate that interdependence among managers and analysts,
both providing service to common investor owners, can exacerbate agency problems. Managers
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have incentive to reduce accessibility in order to maximize their self-interested behavior, and
analysts have restricted incentive to call managers out on this behavior as they have prefer to
maintain optimism over the stocks they cover in their own self-interest. Thus, both managers
and analysts pursue their self-interests at the expense of owner interests.
I also believe this work contributes to the discussion on inter-temporal tradeoffs as agents
seek to insure large losses to their future self-interests by agreeing to smaller near term losses in
those self-interests. Assurance game theoretic reasoning suggests that managers will be
accessible, risking near term scrutiny for the chance that analysts will mutually cooperate with
optimism, insuring future managerial self-interested behavior. Interdependence among parties
can promote coordinated behavior toward long-run outcomes, but only when there is assurance
that coordination is mutual. Results indicate these assurances are hard to achieve consistent with
support for short-termism among managers in response to capital markets (Laverty, 1996).
Instead of pursuing a path that could result in a longer-term self-interested payoff (the assurance
game perspective), managers are more likely to defect to try to maximize their near term selfinterested behavior (the prisoner’s dilemma perspective). Differing incentives can change
managers’ payoff horizons (Souder & Shaver, 2010), suggesting these incentives may increase
the likelihood of managers engaging in an assurance game. Just as these results demonstrate that
contextual influence, namely firm performance, influences game choice, future research could
examine individual-level antecedents to game choice.
In addition, these results refine broader theory that examines cooperative relationships.
When times are tough, coordinated behavior among individuals or organizations, motivated by
assurance game-theoretic arguments of repeated, interdependent strategic interactions, provides
opportunity to maximize payoffs. In the domain of alliances this suggests alliances are more
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likely to payoff when the partners are coming together in reaction to a challenging competitive
environment, rather than a as a proactive, exploration alliance. Furthermore, assurance gametheoretic models have the opportunity to provide empirical motivation for organizational
engagement in domains such as corporate social responsibility and environmental sustainability
that have called for coordination among external stakeholders (Neubaum & Zahra, 2006) and
through external industry groups, networks, or other group forums (Juravle & Lewis, 2009;
Roome, 1994). These alliances are more likely to yield coordinated engagement when the
motivation has a sense of urgency.

7.3 Empirical Extensions
I make several methodological contributions as I have developed unique measures to
critical manager and analyst constructs. In a post-RegFD environment I introduce a new
measure to capture private information sharing that is appropriately more passive than past
selective disclosure practices. Even before RegFD finance and accounting scholars lamented the
lack of measures available to capture managerial private information disclosures (Beattie,
McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004; Core, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001), particularly now that
Association of Investment Management and Research (AIMR) reports are no longer available.
These reports collected data on the quality of public disclosures and non-public information
exchanges between managers and analysts (Healy et al., 1999; Lang & Lundholm, 1993). In the
absence of these reports and to improve upon the objectivity of measuring analyst acquisition
and use of private information, accounting scholars have called for methods that incorporate
content analysis (Beattie et al., 2004; Core, 2001). As a step forward in using content-based
methodology in a post-RegFD environment I capture the internal access that managers allow
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analysts providing analysts with the opportunity to gather private information. Specifically, I use
content analysis of 8k filings to capture management meetings with the investment community
that require disclosure under RegFD.
I selected the insurance industry to be able to isolate managerial self-interested behavior,
in particular self-interested risk aversion. While the management literature often relies on
measures of firm-level risk (for review of risk measures see Miller & Bromiley, 1990) or
composites of risky behaviors (Devers et al., 2008), these measures do not isolate the risk in
specific managerial discretionary decisions. Furthermore, I argued that managers are more likely
to make self-interested decisions in industry-specific domains where investors and owners are
less attentive, but analysts with industry expertise are attentive. While benefit and claim reserves
are studied in the accounting literature as a specific accrual over which managers exercise
discretion (Beaver et al., 2003; Gaver & Paterson, 2004; Petroni, 1992), I highlight the risk and
slack properties of these discretionary claim reserving decisions to isolate a discrete selfinterested managerial behavior.
Finally, I more completely capture the effect analyst forecast optimism, by incorporating
the non-linear effect of this variable on managerial behavior. With optimistic analyst forecasts
serving both as an indicator of confidence to investors (Amir & Ganzach, 1998) and a financial
target for managers (Graham et al., 2005), I find a positive relationship between forecast
optimism and managerial self-interested behavior that tapers off when forecasts get overly
optimistic. This more nuanced way of capturing analyst optimism makes a contribution to
finance, accounting and management models that examine analyst forecasts.
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7.4 Limitations and Future Research Opportunities
7.4.1 Empirical limitations. While using reserves to proxy managerial self-interested behavior
provides a strong discrete indicator, a derivative, reserve development, is more commonly found
in the accounting literature (e.g. Beaver et al., 2003; Petroni, 1992). Reserve development more
closely captures the discretion managers exercise in setting reserves by looking at how managers
estimated the uncertain component of reserves. When prior period claims are finally settled
managers make revisions, called prior period reserve development. If the reserves are unbiased
then, on average, there would not be development. Development is positive when managers
underfunded reserves in the prior period (reserves were understated) and negative when the
reserves were overstated. This better captures exactly when managers manipulated reserves and
by how much. That being said, I used a fixed effects specification so I am not comparing
differences across firms where reserve development may be a more useful measure.
Another significant empirical limitation to this study rests in the measurement timing of
several of my key variables. My theory explains a dynamic exchange relationship between
managers and analysts, but my data does limit perceptibility of some of the exchange that likely
goes on throughout the year. Management meetings are held throughout the year, analysts issue
and revise forecasts throughout the year and reserves levels are topics of discussion at most
quarterly analyst calls throughout the year. However, I can only measure reserves at the end of
the year, limiting my ability to fully capture the exchange that goes on during the fiscal year. I
think this limitation is particularly salient in testing hypotheses 3 and 4. To ensure temporal
precedence in the meditational model, I used management meetings and analyst coverage in the
following year to proxy for accessibility because I only had end-of-year reserves. Furthermore,
forecast optimism was measured at the start of the year. Thus, when I tested hypothesis 3, I was
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testing whether the optimism on first reported annual forecasts had an effect on the number of
aggregate management meetings throughout the following year. I am not sure managers have
memories long enough to attribute favorable forecasts to their accessibility decisions close to two
years later. This also likely impacted the meditational effect of managerial self-interested
behavior. More likely, when managers adjust reserves to the favorability of forecast revisions,
they immediately attribute this benefit to analysts. Thus, the decision to increase accessibility is
likely more proximal to the benefit in self-interested behavior. The post-hoc analysis attempts to
shorten this time gap, and provides support for the supposition the temporal proximity is critical
in detecting effects in the relationship between managers and analysts.
Finally, my theory and measurement are not completely aligned on the construct of
managerial self-interested behavior in hypothesis 4. Game theory reasons that a player makes
decisions on how to act based on their expectations of how the other player will act and how that
will impact payoffs (Parkhe, 1993). I measure realized managerial self-interest rather than
expected self-interests, which could be meaningfully different. Managers may have different
expectations about the impact of forecast optimism on their self-interested behavior than they
actually realize. I didn’t find a meaningful relationship between realized payoffs and
accessibility, but this could be attributed to differences between realized and expected payoffs,
namely when managers are making accessibility decisions on their expected, not realized,
payoffs.

7.4.2 Theoretical limitations and research opportunities. While I think this work is critical in
starting to unpack the nature of the interaction at the manager-analyst interface, it opens the door
for additional research to clarify and further bound this model. In this section, I highlight some

85

of the theoretical limitations of this study and future work that could extend from my
dissertation.

Game choice. First, I deal directly with the limited support I found for an assurance game
between managers and analysts. The payoffs indicated more support for a prisoner’s dilemma
game than an assurance game, which suggests that either managers can not achieve their highest
payoffs when they coordinate with analysts or managers and analysts lack the mutual trust to
fully coordinate and achieve their highest payoffs. One way to examine this issue would be to
see if RegFD served as a true “game changer.” Was an assurance game in effect prior to RegFD,
but with the regulation shaking up the relationship between managers and analysts, did a
prisoner’s dilemma prevail? I did not check for this game changing behavior because I did not
have a good measure of accessibility prior to RegFD. Recall, prior to RegFD managers and
analysts did not have to disclose their meetings. However, other proxies, such as school ties
(Cohen et al., 2010), could be used as a proxy for accessibility to test the hypothesis that RegFD
was a “game-changer”. In addition to RegFD working to deter manager and analyst collusion, it
is also possible that increasing regulatory pressure placed on brokerages and investment banks
(Demos, 2013; Russolillo, 2012) has also limited the ability for managers and analysts to
coordinate, pushing them increasingly toward a prisoner’s dilemma game and away from an
assurance game.

Game players. In addition to studying game changes between managers and analysts, it is also
important to more fully incorporate analyst outcomes into the model. Just as managers risk
added scrutiny when they are accessible to analysts, analysts too take a risk when issuing lenient
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optimistic forecasts because this behavior runs counter to their purpose as information
intermediaries for owners and potential investors. This suggests that analysts, motivated by their
self-interest, make a temporal trade-off in their forecasts to secure highly coveted information
from managers that will fuel their future accuracy. It is possible that analysts put some of their
current accuracy and good-will with investors at risk to insure the sustained accuracy that is most
important to their professional recognition and wealth (CFA Institute, May 28, 2008; Hong &
Kubik, 2003). While I do not fully incorporate this consideration of analyst motivations into this
study, it implies several opportunities for future research.
First, while analyst and investors goals appear to be aligned around forecast accuracy, if
analysts are willing to make a self-interested temporal trade-off in their accuracy this suggests
that even goals that appear qualitatively aligned may be misaligned on other dimensions such as
temporal horizon, generating agency-like costs where there appears there should be none. Future
research should examine analyst self-interested behavior over time. Second, future research
could incorporate joint consideration of manager and analyst self-interested outcomes to predict
selection into the payoff matrix over time, more fully capturing the essence of an assurance
game.
From the perspective of owners, analyst coverage may provide legitimacy and monitoring
benefits, but my work demonstrates that this is not likely the equilibrium state. Managers are
more likely to use analysts to maximize managerial self-interested payoffs by restricting internal
access. Even when managers are accessible to analysts, they are likely looking for analysts to
reciprocate with artificially optimistic forecasts. These outcomes have potentially valuedestroying implications for managers. There is work in the accounting literature that indicates
investors are aware of the coordinated behavior between managers and analysts and use their
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awareness to place pressure on analyst’s forecasts (Löffler, 1998). This suggests investors likely
place pressure on managers as well, making them a relevant third party in this game-theoretic
model. While I bound this model to the manager and analyst interaction I do recognize the
important role of owners. Indirectly firm performance represents investors’ interests, a condition
when investors are more or less likely to scrutinize managerial behavior. The post-hoc findings
of a significant three-way interaction between managers, analysts and firm performance suggest
the presence of a 3-player game. Future work could more fully incorporate owners into the game
to gain a better understanding of the evolving role analysts play in both owners’ and managers’
utility functions.
A three party game can highlight the limits of a coordinated relationship between
managers and analysts. Put differently, it is likely that value-maximizing owners will only incur
so many costs generated from the interaction between managers and analysts before they defect
by changing the players in the game (e.g. replacing management and switching their investment
strategy). Furthermore, despite the flurry of interest on analysts in the management literature no
work links analysts with firm performance outcomes aside from stock performance. Again,
game theoretic reasoning would force consideration of the costs and benefits of owner
interactions with analysts and managers. Only when we can account for the real trade-offs that
owners are making in their interactions with analysts, can we ultimately theorize on the
performance implications of analyst coverage.

Level of analysis. Future research could also take a more micro view, examining the dyadic
relationship between an individual manager and an individual analyst. This dissertation has
examined aggregate level analyst behavior using consensus analyst forecasts. However, while

88

analysts are foundationally interested in achieving accuracy (Hong & Kubik, 2003), they also
want to be different from their peers. Individual analysts anti-herd (Bernhardt et al., 2006) as
they seek to differentiate from one another in order to attract customers. Research has used
proxies like network ties (Burt, 2007; Cohen et al., 2010) to examine the likelihood of
information exchange between managers and analysts at a dyadic level. Future research could
look at this flow of information more directly using filings on management meetings.
Professional and educational ties should predict patterns in meetings with management,
providing validation for those proxy measures. Furthermore, this area is ripe for more
exploratory research with analysts to identify any other systematic indicators of private
information exchange in analyst reports or the MD&A sections of annual reports that content
analysis could detect.

Simultaneous consideration of alternative bonding mechanisms. Another area for future
research is identifying more bonding mechanisms that managers have at their disposal. For
example, I identified accessibility as one way in which managers bond themselves to analysts.
While accessibility benefits analysts, managers can engage in other activities that positively
contribute to analyst accuracy. Since analysts have more expertise in their industries of
specialization they are more comfortable and more accurate valuing firm activity adjacent to
their industries (Boni & Womack, 2006; Groysberg & Lee, 2009; Zuckerman, 1999). Indeed,
managers make investments and engage in strategic actions that analysts can positively value.
For example, Zuckerman (2000) found that firms make de-diversification decisions through
divestment to better align themselves to their covering analysts’ industries. Similarly, Benner
(2010) found analysts discourage adoption of technologies that are considered radically new to
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the industry because analysts are unsure how to value adopters. Ultimately, managers that do
undertake unique strategies are penalized by analysts who have to incur additional information
costs to learn about the unique strategy (Litov et al., 2012), while managers that focus on the
core business are rewarded with higher valuations (Nicolai et al., 2010). Thus, managers could
bond with analysts through industry-aligned strategic actions, which future research could
explore.
Similarly, shorter horizon investments are easier for analysts to value. Managers looking
to bond with analysts may emphasize short-term profits over long-term profits, even though short
term investments are not necessarily risk averse (Souder & Shaver, 2010) and firm value
decreases with short-term investment (Souder, 2007). Nevertheless, analysts struggle to value
future earnings streams (Boni & Womack, 2006; Conroy & Harris, 1987) that would come from
longer horizon investments. There is evidence that managers try to appease analysts with shortterm behaviors (Zhang & Gimeno, 2010) and reductions in longer-term investments (Benner &
Ranganathan, 2012; Gentry & Shen, 2013). Thus, managers could maintain a short-term horizon
investment portfolio to contribute to analyst accuracy and bond themselves to analysts.
Therefore, both industry-aligned and short-horizon strategic actions are potentially
alternative types of bonding mechanisms undertaken by managers. Future research could not
only examine these strategic actions using similar game-theoretic reasoning, but also examine
the trade-off between bonding activities. Since strategic actions are far more difficult to reverse
than accessibility, managers would likely have to be very assured of analyst reciprocation to use
these bonding mechanisms.
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Simultaneous consideration of alternative monitoring mechanisms. In addition to the
consideration of multiple, simultaneous bonding mechanisms, future research could consider
simultaneous monitoring mechanisms. I argue analysts are an external form of monitoring over
managerial behavior because owners do not specifically direct analyst behavior. Owners control
a wide range of internal monitoring activities (e.g. boards, information systems, self-monitoring
through incentives). The interplay between different monitoring mechanisms, including external
mechanisms like analysts, their relative costs and monitoring benefits could further inform
agency models. For example, managers are more likely to direct attention toward institutional
owners as institutional ownership increases (Westphal & Bednar, 2008), and possibly away from
analysts. Furthermore, ownership concentration is a substitute for internal mechanisms to
monitor managers (Desender, Aguilera, Crespi, & Garcia‐Cestona, 2013; Wiseman, Cuevas‐
Rodríguez, & Gomez‐Mejia, 2012), and may also be a substitute for external monitoring
mechanisms, like security analysts. Future research should consider the impact of substitution
for analyst monitoring.
Another area for future research in the domain of monitoring mechanisms is the
relationship between managerial self-monitoring, through ownership and stock options, and
analyst monitoring. When managers hold ownership they have a personal stake in growing the
value of the stock, which would suggest added engagement with analysts who have significant
influence over stock price. However, owner-managers no longer look to analysts to access
information and expertise and don’t have the incentive to add analyst-related costs that would
only serve to reduce their residuals. Indeed, the agency problem ceases to exist for ownermanagers because there is no separation of ownership and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983b),
preempting the role of analysts as monitors. Thus, in firms with significant managerial
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ownership is this game theoretic model less applicable because there is less incentive for
managers to coordinate with analysts according to agency arguments, or is the game-theoretic
model even more applicable because owner-managers are trying to optimally balance across their
self-interests – risk aversion and stability with residual maximization? The manager-analyst
interface could be an area to examine these competing self-interests.

7.5 Practical Implications
This dissertation highlights the costs involved when principals draw on managers and
analysts to achieve their goals. In theory, owners benefit when analysts dominant monitors. In
this scenario managers are accessible to analysts, but analysts continue to strictly monitor
managerial behavior, incorporating any information into their forecasts. As a result, managers’
self-interested behavior is suppressed to it lowest levels. The aggregate management literature
would seem to suggest that this is the most common state, holding analysts as powerful
institutional monitors directing managerial behavior (e.g. Benner & Ranganathan, 2012; Gentry
& Shen, 2013; Zhang & Gimeno, 2010; Zuckerman, 2000). However, these results suggest
managers largely ignore analysts when firms are performing well. Furthermore, assurance game
theoretic reasoning holds that analyst dominance is not a sustainable equilibrium and unlikely to
drive consistent value for owners. More likely analysts and managers will mutually coordinate
or not, both leading to suboptimal outcomes for owners. While this would seem to argue against
the utility of analysts for investors, I think it more likely acknowledges analysts as a doubleedged sword for firms. Analysts are important to attracting capital and maintaining market value
(e.g. Brown et al., 1985; Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Zuckerman, 1999), but, somewhat paradoxically,
they engage with managers in such a way that encourages non-optimal uses of firm capital.
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The evidence from this study suggests that manager’s self-interested behavior is actually
minimized when analysts are pessimistic and managers are inaccessible (both defect). Given this
is the state that holds the largest portion of the sample, this would seem to suggest that owner’s
are benefiting from the tension between managers and analysts. However, owner’s want to hold
stocks with future promise and these results indicate that as soon as analysts are even modestly
optimistic on firms with inaccessible managers, managerial self-interested behavior takes off.
These results seem to provide support for owner efforts to increase managerial accessibility in
the wake of RegFD where managers benefit from inaccessibility. However, more broadly this
research demonstrates that managers and analysts have adapted their behavior after RegFD.
Further regulation may just continue to propel managers and analysts toward a game that may
never be possible to regulate, as they adapt with increasingly private and subtle information
exchange (Solomon, 2014).

7.6 Conclusion
Current research has managers playing a relatively deferential role in their relationship to
analysts with analysts exerting dominant influence over managers as monitors and powerful
institutions. I argue both managers and analysts have interdependent self-interested outcomes
that allows for more collaborative, but also more contentious, models of manager and analyst
interaction commonly observed in practice, but not fully accounted for in current theory.
Managerial self-interested behavior is sensitive to the degree of optimism in analysts’ forecasts
as analysts direct the tide of investor attention. In particular, managers are able to maximize
their self-interested behavior when they restrict their accessibility to analysts at a time when
analysts are optimistic and firm performance is strong.
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FIGURE 1: Model of the Manager-Analyst Interface
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FIGURE 2: Manager Payoff Decision Tree
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FIGURE 3: Payoff Matrix for Assurance Game Between Managers and Analysts
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Accessible Q1: Mutual Coordination
Q2: Analyst Dominant
(A)
(MAP)
(MAO)
Analysts issue optimistic forecasts
Pessimistic forecasts attract investor
allowing managers to engage in
scrutiny, constraining managerial selfself-interested behavior. Managers interested behavior. Furthermore, by
are accessible to gain assurances for being accessible, managers are inviting
analyst optimism further
added scrutiny over their behavior,
maximizing their ability to engage
minimizing their ability to act selfin self-interested behavior.
interestedly.
InQ3: Manager Dominant
Q4: Mutual Defection
accessible (MIO)
(MIP)
(I)
Analysts issue optimistic forecasts
Pessimistic forecasts attract investor
allowing managers engage in selfscrutiny, constraining managerial selfinterested behavior. However,
interested behavior. Managers can
analyst optimism will be fleeting
engage in some self-interested behavior
without reciprocation from
by being inaccessible to analysts, but
managers.
absent analyst optimism, investors will
still scrutinize managerial behavior.
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FIGURE 4: Curvilinear Effect of Analyst Forecast Optimism on Managerial Self-interested
Behavior
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FIGURE 5: Predicted Managerial Self-interested Behavior at High and Low Levels of ROE
across a range of Analyst Forecast Optimism

FIGURE 6: Observation Frequencies and Managerial Mean Payoffs Across the Payoff
Matrix
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FIGURE 7a: Predicted Managerial Self-interested Behavior at Above and Below Mean
Accessibility across a range of Analyst Forecast Optimism

FIGURE 7b: Predicted Managerial Self-interested Behavior Above and Below Mean
Accessibility across a range of Analyst Forecast Optimism with Associated Payoffs
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FIGURE 8a: Curvilinear Effect of Analyst Forecast Optimism on Predicted Managerial
Self-interested Behavior (1991-2012 Sample)

FIGURE 8b: Predicted Managerial Self-interested Behavior at High and Low Levels of
ROE across a range of Analyst Forecast Optimism (1991-2012 Sample)
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FIGURE 9: Post-hoc Curvilinear Effect of Analyst Forecast Optimism on Predicted
Managerial Accessibility (using year end accessibility)
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FIGURE 10a: Observation Frequencies and Managerial Mean Payoffs Across the Payoff
Matrix At Above Mean Firm Performance

FIGURE 10b: Observation Frequencies and Managerial Mean Payoffs Across the Payoff
Matrix At Below Mean Firm Performance
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FIGURE 11: Post-hoc Predicted Managerial Self-interested Behavior across Three-way
Interaction of Analyst Forecast Optimism, Managerial Accessibility and ROE
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